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In July 2016, a failed ​coup d'état ​plunged Turkey into a nationwide state of emergency. Despite                
its recent status as a model for democratization in the Middle East, Turkey has veered               
dangerously towards authoritarianism under emergency rule. The state of emergency has           
empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to bypass parliament and pass sweeping            
new anti-terror laws by executive decree. Under the international legal framework, the state of              
emergency has further allowed Turkey to suspend its human rights obligations as a states party to                
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political              
Rights. Turkey’s emergency counterterrorism laws and policies have increasingly been used to            
target dissident journalists, academics, human rights activists and members of the political            
opposition and prosecute them on heavily politicized and trumped-up terrorism charges.  
 
Using the current situation in Turkey as its chief case study, this paper asks two central                
questions. First, it examines how the state of emergency has facilitated human rights abuses,              
finding that freedom of expression has been criminalized by emergency counterterrorism decrees            
and further led to increased risks of torture against detained dissidents. Second, this paper              
investigates what role international human rights law plays and how the existing framework             
might be improved to better strengthen human rights protections during emergencies. It finds that              
the efficacy of monitoring and accountability mechanisms are significantly hindered by political,            
strategic, and economic relations, but argues that those same factors can be used as leverage               
against repressive states. Finally, Turkey’s cross-border efforts to hunt and capture dissidents,            
which have included the use and abuse of international policing systems, bilateral extradition             
treaties, and state-sponsored abductions, reveals a key opportunity for international human rights            
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
 
On the evening of July 15, 2016, factions of the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to overthrow                
the government. Rebel soldiers occupied major landmarks including the Bosphorus bridges and            
Taksim Square in Istanbul, international airports, and state-run media offices, while military            
leadership including the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, commander of the Turkish Land              
Forces, and head of the Turkish Air Force were abducted and held hostage. Using hijacked               1
military aircraft, the ​coup d’etat soldiers bombed Turkish Parliament and the Presidential Palace             
in Ankara. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on holiday in the southern coastal city Marmaris at               
the time, stated that there had also been an attempt to bomb his hotel. Though the government                 2
regained control in less than twenty-four hours, the attempted coup resulted in the deaths of 265                
people, 161 of whom were civilians.   3
 
Amidst the chaotic aftermath of the attempted overthrow, President Erdoğan declared a            
three-month state of emergency on July 20, 2016. The declaration granted the government             4
significant emergency powers, allowing the executive to bypass parliament when drafting new            
laws, limit or suspend rights and freedoms without parliamentary approval, and pass decrees             
without the possibility of appeal to the constitutional court. Though the state of emergency              5
(SoE) was finally lifted in July 2018 - after being extended seven times - several emergency                
measures have been codified into permanent Turkish law.  
 
The special powers granted to the Turkish executive under the SoE have been used to               
significantly expand the country’s domestic counterterrorism mandate. Since the SoE was           
declared, more than 160,000 people across the country have been arrested and 50,000 have either               
been remanded to pretrial custody or prosecuted for terrorism charges under the national             
1 “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hulusi Akar yaşadıklarını ilk kez anlattı,” ​CNN Türk. ​July 17, 2016, 
https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/genelkurmay-baskani-orgeneral-hulusi-akar-yasadiklarini-ilk-kez-anlatti   
2 ​“Erdogan Arrives in Istanbul as Turkish Military Coup Crumbles,” ​Haaretz. ​July 16, 2016, 
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/erdogan-arrives-in-istanbul-as-coup-crumbles-1.5411005  
3 Ayla Jean Yackley and Nick Tattersall, “Death toll rises to 265 in failed Turkey coup: official.” ​Reuters​,​ ​July 16, 
2016, ​https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-casualties-idUSKCN0ZW132  
4 ​Gareth Jones and Asli Kandemir, “Turkey’s Erdogan announces three-month state of emergency,” ​Reuters,​ July 
20, 2016, ​https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-erdogan-emergency-idUSKCN1002TU  
5 Ceylan Yeginsu and Safak Timur, "Turkey's Post-Coup Crackdown Targets Kurdish Politicians,"​ The New York 
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Anti-Terror Law. Terrorism charges have also been used to pursue Turkish nationals outside of              6
the country’s borders: Ankara has issued hundreds of extradition requests and Interpol ‘Red             
Notice’ arrest warrants, and has further acknowledged its use of covert operations to seize more               
than 100 Turkish nationals from nearly two dozen countries abroad. Mass arrests under the SoE               7
have not been strictly limited to people connected to the coup but have instead increasingly               
targeted dissident members of civil society, particularly human rights defenders, journalists,           
academics, opposition politicians, lawyers and judges, the vast majority of whom have been             
detained on tenuous terrorism-related grounds.  
 
Turkey has been widely condemned by international human rights organizations for violating            
basic civil and political rights ​en masse since the attempted coup, particularly rights to freedom               
of expression, association, and assembly, and rights related to due process and fair trial. Further               8
questions have been raised regarding the treatment of detainees in Turkish prisons, as severe              
human rights abuses including forced disappearances, rape, sexual abuse, waterboarding, electric           
shocks and other forms of torture have been consistently reported since 2016. The state of               9
emergency and the executive powers it grants have allowed for the implementation of sweeping              
anti-terrorism measures, in turn impacting basic rights and freedoms of Turkish nationals both             
inside and outside of the country.  
 
A. Research Objective and Methodology 
 
Using the current situation in Turkey as its chief case study, this paper asks two central                
questions. First, how do states of emergency impact human rights? Second, what role does              
international human rights law (IHRL) play during public emergencies? Does the existing legal             
framework effectively monitor and restrain human rights abuses during emergencies? If not, how             
might the relevant areas of IHRL be improved to better strengthen human rights protections              
during SoE periods? 
 
This paper begins with the basic hypothesis that states of emergency facilitate human rights              
abuses by increasing the power of the executive vis-a-vis the legislative and judicial bodies of               
the state. Excluding SoEs declared in the face of natural disasters, public emergencies are nearly               
6  "Turkey: Law No. 3713 of 1991, Law to Fight Terrorism." Refworld, last modified April 12, 1991, accessed 
September 11, 2018,  ​http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c4477652.html​ and "World Report 2018: Rights Trends in 
Turkey," Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2018, ​https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/turkey​.  
7 Dildar Baykan, “Over 100 FETO members brought back to Turkey: Cavusoglu,” ​Anadolu Agency​,​ ​July 16, 2018, 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/over-100-feto-members-brought-back-to-turkey-cavusoglu/1205603   
8 "Turkey: Crackdown on Kurdish Opposition," Human Rights Watch. March 20, 2017, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/20/turkey-crackdown-kurdish-opposition​.  
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always declared on the basis of ‘terrorism’, which results in the justification of emergency              
measures as necessary to ‘counter terror’ and ‘protect national security.’ This paper will             
therefore examine how emergency powers have been used in the context of countering terrorism              
in Turkey, closely analyzing the impacts of anti-terror emergency decrees on fundamental rights             
and freedoms. Particular attention will be paid to the human rights implications of             
counterterrorism measures used transnationally, investigating the responsibilities of other states          
under international human rights law with regard to issues of extradition, state-sponsored            
abductions, torture and the fundamental legal principle  of ​non-refoulement​. 
 
The second objective of this research is to examine the international legal framework and              
enforcement mechanisms designed to monitor government action and protect human rights under            
SoEs. Under international law, SoE are primarily governed by the derogation clauses set out first               
by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1953 and subsequently by the              
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966. The latter section of this               
paper will examine the judicial bodies and mechanisms mandated with monitoring the            
compliance of state parties to the SoE derogation provisions laid out in the ECHR and the                
ICCPR, questioning the effectiveness of existing mechanisms in restraining government actions           
and seeking to identify key political factors limiting their successful implementation.  
 
Turkey is only one example of the increasingly visible connection between SoEs and expansive              
counterterrorism campaigns: France, Britain, the United States, and several other countries have            
passed similarly dangerous counterterrorism laws during emergencies on the pretext of national            
security. There is a clear link between emergency regimes and grave human rights abuses, with               10
‘national security’ among the most powerful rationales governments use to repress, surveil and             
control civilian populations. As counterterrorism measures grow more invasive and          11
technologically sophisticated, the risks posed to human rights and civil liberties have            
proliferated, particularly for vulnerable groups like ethnic and religious minorities. By           
thoroughly examining Turkey as its central case study, this research ultimately hopes to             
contribute to the ongoing debate regarding how international human rights law can or should              
respond to the troubling impacts of counterterrorism on human rights, particularly during            
emergency situations.  
 
To answer its research questions, this paper relies on qualitative research methods and             
procedures, primarily legal research, analysis of SoE scholarship and case law, ECtHR            
10 Francesco Ragazzi, "Suspect Community or Suspect Category? The Impact of Counter-terrorism as ‘policed 
Multiculturalism’,"​ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies​ 42, no. 5 (2016): 726, 
doi:10.1080/1369183x.2015.1121807. 
11 Joan F. Hartman, "Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision." ​Human 
Rights Quarterly​ 7, no. 1 (1985): 91, doi:10.2307/762039. 
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jurisprudence, and a close assessment of relevant publicly available documents. Documents           
examined include local, regional, and international media reports; reports, press releases,           
statements, and primary research conducted by human rights advocacy groups and civil society             
organizations, legal bodies and bar associations, the UN Human Rights Committee, various            
human rights and rule of law-related committees formed under the auspices of the Council of               
Europe, with particular weight afforded to the work of the Venice Commission, and the              
fact-finding reports of several UN Special Rapporteurs following missions to Turkey. Finally, a             
close analysis of available primary research was conducted, namely transcripts and summaries            
of interviews with anonymous and identified Turkish detainees and dissidents published by            
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, local human rights organizations and international           
bodies like the Crisis Group. 
 
B. Literature Review 
 
The following section briefly outlines a theoretical framework within which to situate and             
explore the nexus between human rights, counterterrorism, and states of emergency. I first             
examine the rise of the security state paradigm in political theory and international relations              
literature, within which we can develop a fuller idea of SoEs as a form of exceptional rule that                  
often acts as a precursor to competitive authoritarianism. Second, I investigate how conceptions             
of terrorism in Turkey have shifted from ethno-religious ‘othering’ to regime security, wherein             
the public enemy is defined by its opposition to official state policy and the ruling party. Third, I                  
analyze how the anti-imperialist nationalism used to eliminate support for dissidents damages            
international leverage: critics, dissidents, and proponents of ‘Western’ liberal democracy and its            
central tenets - secularism, freedom of the press, rule of law, and so on - are accused of acting                   
not against the government but against the Turkish state itself. Critical questions arising here are               
rooted in underlying politico-philosophical questions of power, which fundamentally shape the           
relationship between terrorism and legitimate civil disobedience or political dissent. Finally, I            
examine the relationship between state sovereignty and the international human rights regime,            
paying particular attention to the ECHR and the ICCPR, and survey existing critiques of SoE               
derogations and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
i. Rise of the Security State: Exceptional Rule and Authoritarianism 
 
Emergency anti-terror laws came into force in the United States, Canada, Britain, France,             
Belgium and several other European states in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks              
perpetrated on September 11, 2001. This new ‘security state’ that rose from the ashes of the early                 
2000s was defined by a significant expansion of government surveillance, the limiting of civil              
and individual liberties, and, as Kaygusuz (2018) writes, a “massive surge in coercive state              
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activity” that has “facilitated the effective management of growing social and political dissent.”             12
The permanent state of exception and securitization as a technique of government has become a               
key focus of political theory and international relations (IR) scholarship, much of which agrees              
that the new security order has increasingly interfered with social and political life.   13
 
In the context of the post-9/11 passage of the controversial U.S. Patriot Act, Agamben (2003)               
highlighted how counterterrorism measures and legislation have reorganized political life in           
liberal democracies into a permanent, normalized state of exception. The state of exception is              14
characterized by three critical features: the loss of power and independence of key state              
institutions; the emergence of a parallel network of decisionmakers who replace institutional and             
accountable decisionmaking mechanisms; and the rapid codification of exceptional practices into           
permanent legislation. Drawing on Poulantzas’ theory of authoritarian statism, which          15
highlighted the use of authoritarian practices in liberal democracies throughout the 1970s and             
80s, Boukalas (2008) similarly argued that since 9/11 several ‘emergency-type features’ have            
been normalized and incorporated into capitalist liberal democracies. He identified two trends            16
particularly ascendent today: first, the increased concentration of power at the executive level, at              
the expense of legislative and judicial bodies, and second, the criminalization of political             
activities and restricted use of democratic channels in order to marginalize and oppress segments              
of society. Bruff (2014) further develops this in his conceptualization of ​authoritarian            17
neoliberalism​, characterized as a shift away from public negotiation and consent and toward             
coercive constitutional and legal mechanisms: “Dominant social groups are less interested in            
neutralizing resistance and dissent via concessions and forms of compromise…favoring instead           
the explicit exclusion and marginalization of subordinate social groups through the           
constitutionally and legally engineered self-disempowerment” of key democratic institutions.   18
 
A growing body of IR scholarship has focused on global ‘democratic retrenchment’ since the              
2000s, noting weakening democratic systems in the Balkans, Russia, Latin America, Eastern            
12 Özlem Kaygusuz, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Regime Security in Turkey: Moving to an ‘Exceptional State’ 
under AKP,” ​South European Society and Politics​ 23 (June 2018): 282, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2018.1480332​.  
13 See, for example, Agamben 2003; Huysmans 2004; Brown 2005; Boukalas 2008. 
14 ​Giorgio Agamben, ​State of Exception​, trans. Kevin Attell (University of Chicago Press, Ltd. 2005), originally 
published as ​Stato di eccezione​, 2003 Bollati Boringhieri editore s.r.l., Torino.   
15 ​Christos Boukalas, “No Exceptions: Authoritarian Statism. Agamben, Poulantzas, and Homeland Security,” 
Critical Studies on Terrorism ​7, no.1​ ​(Winter 2014): 12, ​http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2013.877667​. 
16 ​See​ Nicos Poulantzas, ​State, Power, Socialism​, trans. Patrick Camiller (Verso, 1980), originally published as 
L’etat, le Pouvoir, le Socialisme​ (Presses Universitaires de France, 1978).  
17 ​Christos Boukalas, “Counterterrorism legislation and the U.S. State form: authoritarian statism, phase 3,” ​Radical 
Philosophy​ 151, no. 1 ( Sept/Oct. 2008): 39. 
https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/counterterrorism-legislation-and-the-us-state-form  
18 ​Ian Bruff, “The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism,” ​Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & 
Society ​26, no. 1 (2014): 116, ​https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2013.843250​.  
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Europe and rising right-wing movements across Western Europe and North America. As            19
Akyuz and Hess (2018) observe, earlier waves of democratization have stalled and even reversed              
in many countries over the last two decades, while international NGO Freedom House has found               
a global decline in civil liberties and political rights over the same time period. Increasing in                20
the stead of faltering liberal democracies are hybrid regimes: in essence, governments that hold              
regular elections but strategically weaken other critical elements of liberal democracy, namely            
the independence of the judiciary, parliamentary checks and balances, and freedom of media,             
academia, and civil society. Levitsky and Way (2010) call this ​competitive authoritarianism​:            21
regimes combine electoral competition with varying degrees of autocracy, holding competitive           
elections but allowing them to be heavily influenced by electoral manipulation, unfair media             
access, abuse of state resources, and harassment, violence, and intimidation. Competitive           22
authoritarianism is closely related to ​democratic backsliding​, defined by Akyuz and Hess (2018)             
as “a decrease in the competitiveness (or potential of competitiveness) of the electoral playing              
field due to the concentration of power in the hands of the incumbent executive, relative to other                 
actors” , the deliberate result of “regime choices made by incumbent executive leaders to reduce              23
the competitiveness of elections, weaken the protection of civil liberties, manipulate the electoral             
playing field, and erode formal limits on executive power.”  24
 
Certainly this shift to competitive authoritarianism is visible in Turkey, where the ruling ​Adalet              
ve Kalkınma Partisi ​(AKP) has jailed members of parliament, brought media to heel, and              
criminalized dissent, all of which will be explored in the subsequent sections. Critical to our               
purposes here is the close link between Turkey’s growing authoritarianism and its use of states of                
emergency, as is mirrored in other hybrid regimes with similar trajectories. In most cases,              
transitions from democracy to ‘soft authoritarianism’, or indeed from soft to hard            
authoritarianism, are directly enabled by states of emergency and the expansive executive            





19 ​Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” ​Journal of Democracy​ 13, no. 2 
(April 2002): 2, ​https://scholar.harvard.edu/levitsky/files/SL_elections.pdf​.  
20 Kadir Akyuz and Steve Hess, “Turkey Looks East: International Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in a 
Hybrid Regime,” ​Mediterranean Quarterly ​29, no. 2,​ ​(2018): 1. ​https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-6898075​. 
21 Hybrid regimes have also been conceptualized as semi-democracies (Case 1993), virtual democracies (Norris and 
Jones 1998), illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997), and soft authoritarianism (Means 1996; Winckler 1984).  
22 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, ​Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War​, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.  
23 Akyuz and Hess, “Turkey Looks East,” 4. 
24 Jennifer Raymond Dresden and Marc Morje Howard, “Authoritarian backsliding and the concentration of political 
power,” ​Democratization ​23, no. 7​ ​(2016): 1125. ​https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1045884​. 
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ii. Elusive Enemies: From Ethno-Religious Othering to Regime Security 
 
Conceptions of terrorism shifted in the post-9/11 era from political and ideological            
underpinnings to a conflation with ethnic separatism, ethnic nationalism and religious           
extremism. As a result, minority communities associated with ethnic liberation movements           
became “inescapably criminalized”, a phenomenon particularly apparent in the cases of the            
Kurds and the Palestinians. For example, as Sentas (2015) noted, the enjoyment of human              25
rights among Kurdish communities in Western Europe has been impacted as a result of this               
conflation between terrorism and ethnic nationalism, with the Kurdish diaspora collectively           
criminalized and subject to security policing in Britain as a ‘suspect community.’   26
 
A significant body of literature analyzes the intriguing dynamics shaping the relationship            
between ethno-religious demands for separatism, political violence, and human rights. Hannum           
(1990), in considering whether ethnic self-determination might in fact comprise a ‘right to             
autonomy’, argued that separatist demands may be legitimate in the face of extreme denials of               
human rights, which aligns with theories of ‘internal self-determination’. As per the landmark             27
ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada (​Reference re Secession of Quebec, ​1998) in determining               
the right of Quebec to secede from Canada, the principle of self-determination allows for              
separation from an existing state “only exceptionally, when the rights of the members of the               
people are violated in a grave and massive way.”  28
 
Human rights thus play a critical role in determining the validity of ethnic claims to               
self-determination and the perception of political violence committed to this end. Most            
importantly to our purposes here, Hannum (1990) made the vital connection between human             
rights violations and accusations of terrorism levelled against a dissident ethnic group, noting             
that: “...the central authorities are able to shift international attention from alleged human rights              
violations to supposed attacks on the state’s sovereignty and territorial unity.” Pokalova (2010)             29
similarly argued that states have a clear incentive to frame ethnic political movements as              
25 ​Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton, "From the Old to the New Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts 
of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation," ​British Journal of Criminology​ 49, no. 5 (2009): 650, 
doi:10.1093/bjc/azp031.  
26 Vicki ​Sentas, "Policing the Diaspora: Kurdish Londoners, MI5 and the Proscription of Terrorist Organizations in 
the United Kingdom," ​British Journal of Criminology​ 56, no. 5 (2015): 899, doi:10.1093/bjc/azv094. 
27 Hurst Hannum, ​Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 11. 
28 "Self-Determination," Oxford Public International Law, last modified June 6, 2017, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e873​.  
29 Hannum, ​Autonomy​, 118. 
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terrorism in order to justify the use of violent repression or mass human rights violations to the                 
wider domestic and international public.  30
 
The underlying legal and philosophical questions of whether ethnic groups possess a ‘right’ to              
autonomy and self-determination fundamentally shape the discourse on political violence and           
terrorism. Though a preliminary understanding of international terrorism was first outlined by            
the global community at the 1937 Terrorism Convention in Geneva, little consensus exists as to               
what constitutes ​terror and where exactly terrorism falls in relation to insurgency and guerrilla              
warfare or what position it occupies on the spectrum of political violence as a whole. As                31
Chadwick (2016) points out, UN principles of equal rights and the self-determination of             
‘peoples’ further complicate political and juridical questions over how to approach purported            
acts of ‘terrorism’ when such acts are perpetrated during an armed struggle for ethnic              
self-determination. This literature is vital to understanding terrorism charges in the context of             32
the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
 
However, as Kaygusuz (2018) writes, while ethnic minorities, migrants, and the poor have long              
been marginalized groups, other social groups - particularly those who vocally oppose or             
criticize government policy - have become increasingly and explicitly excluded under neoliberal            
notions of the rule of law. Turkey is an excellent example of this paradigm shift: while ethnic                 33
minorities including the Kurds and the Armenians have historically been perceived as the chief              
enemies of the Republic, the post-coup crackdown has demonstrated a shift from such             
ethno-religious ‘Othering’ to the targeting of a broad blend of socioeconomic classes and             
political stripes, united simply on the basis of their opposition to government policy. Public              
enemies are no longer defined necessarily by their ethnic heritage but instead by the degree of                
allegiance they hold to the state; ethno-religious separatist threats to the ‘territorial integrity’ of a               
nation-state have been replaced with a broader, more slippery threat, one without any clear or               
specific objective. While terrorism and states of emergency are longtime elements of modern             
Turkey, particularly since the 1980s rise of the militant Kurdish separatist group known by its               
acronym PKK (​Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê​), the AKP has recently widened the definition and             
30 Elena Pokalova, "Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo," ​Studies in Conflict & Terrorism​ 33, 
no. 5 (2010): 430, doi:10.1080/10576101003691564. 
31 ​ The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, colloquially referred to as the Terrorism 
Convention, defined ‘acts of terrorism’ as ‘criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create 
a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public’. ​See​ "U.S. Draft 
Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Act." International Legal Materials 11, no. 06 (1972): 
1382-387. doi:10.1017/s0020782900055704.  
32 Elizabeth Chadwick, “Terrorism and Self-determination," in ​Research Handbook on International Law and 
Terrorism​, ed. Ben Saul (Sydney: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), 298-314. doi:10.4337/9780857938817.00026. 
33 Kaygusuz, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism,” 284. 
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concept of ‘terrorism’ to such a degree that it can be weaponized against anyone who dares                
vocalize social and political dissent.   34
 
This shift reflects the growing popularity of the regime security (RS) paradigm, which is              
described in IR and political theory literature as a set of practices that emerge when governing                
elites view the security of their own survival in power as the primary political priority. As                35
Kaygusuz (2018) articulates, ruling elites who perceive their own political survival as the             
survival of the state itself may employ violent and nonviolent mechanisms to compel and coerce               
other social groups into accepting the same perception. In what might be seen as a rather                36
prescient view of the current situation in Turkey, Jackson (2013) identified several RS             
techniques used by ruling elites who perceive real or alleged threats to their power: the               
reconfiguration of internal security forces and the granting of expansive powers, including            
immunity from the reach of the judiciary; the silencing of opposition through the use of torture,                
imprisonment, and violent suppression of political activities; and monopolizing the media so as             
to control and curate its content, carefully used to project a sheen of legitimacy to the                
international community.  37
 
The key here is the fusion between the ruling regime and the state itself, which complicates the                 
question of a ​coup d’etat in the legal framework on states of emergency. According to Article 15                 
of the ECHR and Article 4 of the ICCPR, the right to derogate from human rights obligations can                  
be invoked only in time of war or other public emergency “threatening the life of the nation.”                 38
The meaning of the term was further developed by the European Court of Human Rights               
(ECtHR) in ​Lawless v. Ireland (1961), wherein the Court defined it as “an exceptional situation               
of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population.” However, the precise threshold of              39
what constitutes a “threat to the life of the nation” remains unclear and relatively open to                
interpretation.  
 
In the context of derogation regimes, the nature of a ​coup d’etat ​- which by definition aim to                  
depose the ruling regime - poses an interesting question. As Nugraha (2018) points out, the               
delegates negotiating the ICCPR text during the eighth session of the UN Commission on              
Human Rights Drafting Committee in 1952 specifically chose the term ‘nation’ as opposed to              
34  For a good analysis on the use of the ‘terrorist’ label as a political tool, see Andre Barrinha, “The political 
importance of labelling: terrorism and Turkey’s discourse on the PKK,” ​Critical Studies on Terrorism​ 4, no. 2 
(2011)  
35  See, for example, Jackson 2013, 162; Job 1992, 144-45; Kindley 2015. 
36  Kaygusuz, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism,” 285. 
37 Richard Jackson, “Regime security,” in ​Contemporary Security Studies​, ed. Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 167.  
38 “Derogation in time of emergency - factsheet.” ​European Court of Human Rights - Press Unit, ​last modified 
August 2018, 2. ​https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Derogation_ENG.pdf  
39 ​Lawless v. Ireland​, No. 1/61, Judgment of July 1, 1961, of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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‘government’ or ‘state.’ The term’s reference to the nation and not to the government indicates               40
that the threat a coup poses to an existing government is insufficient to claim that there is a                  
public emergency. As Hallsworth and Lea (2011) observe, the blurring of the boundary             41
between the security of the ​state and the security of the ​government allows for the political and                 
the criminal to be bound up as one , thereby broadening the type of circumstances under which                42
emergency derogations are permissible under international law.  
 
 
iii. Traitors, Terrorists, and Spies: Foreign Influence and Domestic 
Power 
 
A critical effect of the conflation between state and government is the tendency to portray               
political dissidents not only as traitors and terrorists but as foreign spies. Turkish human rights               
defenders, for example, are smeared as foreign operatives working against Turkey’s national            
interests. Indeed, accusations of both terrorism and espionage have been levelled against several             
dual citizens in the aftermath of the attempted coup: two Turkish-Americans, a NASA scientist              
and a pastor, remain imprisoned at the time of writing on charges of spying; a German-Turkish                
reporter for ​Die Welt newspaper was imprisoned without charge for more than a year on               
‘suspicion of espionage’, released only after Chancellor Angela Merkel personally intervened;           
and President Erdoğan has repeatedly accused detained German and Swedish human rights            
activists of being ‘Western spies’ sent to meddle in Turkish affairs.   43
 
The post-coup crackdown has been accompanied by increasingly hostile anti-West rhetoric, as            
Erdoğan angrily dismissed calls to respect human rights and the rule of law. For example, in                
response to critical comments made by U.S. Central Command Chief General Joseph Votel,             
Erdoğan accused the U.S. of “taking the side of coup plotters instead of thanking this state for                 
defeating the coup attempt.” In response to the French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Marc             44
Ayrault’s warning not to use the failed coup as a ‘blank cheque’ against opponents, Erdoğan               
stated in an interview with ​Al Jazeera​: “Does he have the authority to make these declarations?                
No, he does not. If he wants a lesson in democracy, he can very easily get a lesson in democracy                    
40 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 330th Meeting, 8th Session, 10 June 
1952, E/CN/.4/SR.330, 11-12, ​http://uvallsc.s3.amazonaws.com/travaux/s3fs-public/E-CN_4-SR_330_0.pdf?null​.  
41 Ignatius Yordan Nugraha, “Human rights derogation during coup situations,” ​The International Journal of Human 
Rights ​22, no. 2 (August 2017): 198,  ​https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1359551​.  
42 Simon Hallsworth and John Lea, “Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state,” ​Theoretical 
Criminology ​15, no. 2​ ​(May 2011): 149,  ​https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480610383451​. 
43 Hannah Lucinda Smith, “Human rights workers are Western spies, Erdogan claims,” ​The Times​, July 26, 2017, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/erdogan-brands-detained-human-rights-workers-western-spies-mzft582f8​.  
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from us.” He offered similar rebukes to both the EU and the US in the weeks following the                  45
attempted overthrow, stating in a speech at the presidential palace: “Some people give us advice;               
they say they are worried. Mind your own business! Look at your own deeds!” Erdoğan has                46
used the situation to position himself as a staunch defender of Turkish nationalism and a bulwark                
against insidious Western manipulation in the Muslim world, at one point stating that “the era of                
a submissive Turkey bowing to every Western demand is over.” The clear shift against the               47
West has greatly diminished international leverage over human rights in Turkey and allowed the              
AKP to consolidate domestic power at the expense of foreign influence. 
 
Turkey’s relationship with the international community has played a critical role in its recent              
political history and shaped its response to the coup. Paranoia and suspicion of foreign meddling               
in domestic affairs compromises the efficacy of international law, particularly in countries and             
regions badly impacted by the legacies of colonialism, foreign invasions and outside interference             
in internal politics. The AKP, driven in particular by former foreign minister and prime minister               
Ahmet Davutoğlu, has portrayed the Middle East and the Muslim world as a whole as a                
civilization fallen from grace at the hands of Western imperialism, the legacy of which was               
“artificial borders, conflicted identities and culturally alienated leaderships… that left the region            
prey to foreign ideas and impurities.” Growing anti-Western sentiment fanned by the AKP has              48
given rise to the related conviction that liberal democracy is a form of Western colonialism, and                
that ‘real’ democracy must be Islamic rather than secular.  49
 
According to Palabiyik (2018), the AKP shifted its political strategy around 2010 in response to               
both its lack of progress with EU accession and the spread of the Arab Spring across the Middle                  
East and North Africa, which initiated the current split between Ankara and its Western allies.               50
EU-mandated reforms - particularly those concerning Cyprus and Kurdish issues - had stirred             
resistance among the AKP’s nationalist electoral base, and Turkey’s full membership to the EU              
had likewise been met with “deep concern” by countries including Germany and France. Cinar              51
(2018) credits Davutoğlu with Turkey’s rejection of Western hegemony in world politics and             
45 “Erdogan tells French foreign minister to mind his own business,” ​Radio France International​,​ ​July 21, 2016, 
http://en.rfi.fr/middle-east/20160721-erdogan-tells-french-foreign-minister-mind-his-own-business​.  
46 “Erdogan tells West ‘mind your own business’ as journalists jailed,” ​News 24, ​July 30, 2016, 
https://www.news24.com/World/News/erdogan-tells-west-mind-your-own-business-as-journalists-jailed-20160730​.  
47 “Erdogan: Era of bowing to Western pressure is over,” ​Al Jazeera, ​July 25, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/erdogan-era-bowing-western-pressure-170725135359270.html​.  
48 Birol Baskan, “Islamism and Turkey’s foreign policy during the Arab Spring,” ​Turkish Studies ​19, no. 2 (2018): 
274, ​https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1405346​.  
49 Bill Park, “Populism and Islamism in Turkey,” ​Turkish Studies​ 19, no. 2 (2018): 172. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1407651​.  
50 Mustafa Serdar Palabiyik, “Politicization of recent Turkish history: (ab)use of history as a political discourse in 
Turkey,” ​Turkish Studies​ 19, no. 2 (2018): 248, ​https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1408414​. 
51 Menderes Cinar, “Turkey’s ‘Western’ or ‘Muslim’ identity and the AKP’s civilizational discourse,” ​Turkish 
Studies​ 19, no. 2 (2018): 185,  ​https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1411199​. 
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pro-Western secular democratic ideals, based on the heightened costs and diminishing benefits of             
potential EU accession. Davutoğlu recognized that “the more influential Turkey becomes in the             52
Middle East, the more bargaining power it will possess vis-à-vis the other powers” and              
accordingly viewed the Arab Spring as a key opportunity “to play a regional leadership role, akin                
to that of the Ottoman Empire’s one as protector of the Middle East.”   53
 
Consequently, in the six years prior to the attempted coup, the AKP had begun more heavily                
emphasizing its Islamic ‘authenticity’ in opposition to the pro-Western Kemalist doctrine and            
cultivated a populist nativist image with an increasingly “accusatory tone” towards the            
post-World War I “Europeanizing elites.” As Palabiyik (2018) observes, the AKP has painted             54
competing political parties as historical accomplices to the overthrow of Abdulhamid II, the loss              
of Aegean and other territories in the Lausanne Treaty, the imposition of secularism, the              
abolition of the Caliphate, the banning of the Arabic call to prayer, and the adoption of alphabet                 
reform. In recent years, the AKP has asserted itself as reclaiming Turkey’s rightful identity,              55
reintroducing Ottoman Turkish into the national education curricula, re-Islamifying Turkish          
society, and employing what Park (2018) terms a ‘revisionist approach’ to the country’s foreign              
policy. The AKP’s suspicion of the West has allowed for the easy dismissal of the international                56
human rights regime as untrustworthy, biased, and lacking credibility, ultimately hindering the            
ability of the international community to successfully apply political and diplomatic pressure            
regarding respect for human rights and the rule of law.  
 
Critically, the AKP’s new “unitarian, communal, and civilizational Islamism” casts a suspicious            
eye on those out of step among the country’s own population. According to Sezal and Sezal                57
(2018), the new Islamist nativist doctrine of the AKP has made a concerted effort to highlight the                 
‘foreign’ nature of the Kemalist elite in contrast with Islamic virtues, which has had the effect of                 
representing secularists, liberals, Gulenists, Kemalists, Kurds and adherents of Shi’ism as           
enemies of ‘true’ Islam and of the ‘real’ people of Turkey. It is this shift against secularism and                  58
pro-Western ideals that underpins the broadened conception of ​terrorism in Turkey and has             
positioned social and political dissidents in the crosshairs of counterterrorism. 
 
52 ​Ibid, ​186. 




54 ​Ibid, ​187. 
55 Park, “Populism and Islamism,” 172.  
56 Ibid. 
57 ​ Mustafa A. Sezal and Ihsan Sezal, “Dark taints on the looking glass: Whither ‘New Turkey’?” ​Turkish Studies 
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iv. Sovereignty, Emergencies, and the International Human Rights 
Framework 
 
The formal announcement of a national state of emergency is a legal declaration under both               
international and domestic law, activating the right of governments to suspend rights and             
freedoms ordinarily protected by a country’s constitution or by international human rights law.             
Within the international legal framework, rules relating to emergency rights derogations are set             
out by Article 15 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the ICCPR. The ECHR entered into force on                   
September 3, 1953 and has been ratified by 47 states as of 2018, while the ICCPR entered into                  
force some two decades later on March 23, 1976 and enjoys a more international status with 171                 
states parties.   59
 
Briefly, states parties to the ECHR and the ICCPR are permitted by Article 15 and Article 4 to                  
derogate from the treaty obligations “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the               
life of the nation.” However, derogations under both treaties are conditional: measures must be              60
“strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” and must not be inconsistent with the state                
party’s other obligations under international law. Further, under both treaties, several core            61
rights are considered strictly non-derogable, including the right to life, the right to be free from                
torture and slavery, the right to due process, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.   62
 
The derogation clauses of both the ECHR and the ICCPR have generated much criticism.              
Dolezal (2000), for example, argues that the ICCPR’s failure to strictly define the term ‘public               
emergency’ renders its derogation provision unclear and open to abuse. He identified as a              63
significant weakness the failure to require states to report the specific derogation measures taken,              
which in turns renders it difficult to determine whether state actions meet the test of necessity.                64
Writing in the context of the American-led ‘war on terror’, Fitzpatrick (2003) argued that              
derogations have allowed governments to construct ‘rights-free zones’ that significantly alter the            
59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en​.  
60 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as amended by 
Protocol Nos. 11 and 14, ​Refworld​, ​http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html​ and  UN General Assembly, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations Treaty Series,  available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html  
61 ECHR, ​supra ​64. 
62 Aly Mokhtar, "Human Rights Obligations v. Derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights," ​The International Journal of Human Rights​ 8, no. 1 (2004): 70, doi:10.1080/1364298042000212547. 
63 Scott Dolezal, "The Systematic Failure to Interpret Article IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Is There a Public Emergency in Nigeria?" ​American University International Law Review​ 15, no. 5 (2000): 
1168-69, ​http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=auilr​.  
64  ​Ibid, ​1174. 
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rules on the use of force in international relations and in norms of humanitarian law. Mokhtar                65
(2004) observed that the question of what consequences a state faces if it does not follow the                 
procedures laid down in Article 15 of the ECHR have thus far remained unanswered by the                
Convention organs and previous case law.   66
 
Further, the practical effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are limited by            
political constraints. As Burstein (2006) observes, regional human rights courts like the ECtHR             
are boxed in by the political dynamics between the defendant-state and the rest of the               
community. While some have urged human rights bodies to reconsider their deferential            67
approach to states’ claims regarding derogations, Burstein (2006) found that the dependence of             
courts on member states to enforce their judgements bounds them by human rights norms the               
community already defines as acceptable, thus preventing a more aggressive approach.   68
 
In the post-9/11 period, the scope of international human rights law has been increasingly limited               
by national security policies passed under states of exception, as has been the case in Turkey,                
France, Britain and Ukraine, among others. As Kadelbach and Roth-Isigkeit (2017) argue,            
counterterrorism policy, states of emergency and constitutional reservations made by states share            
the common aim of defining the essence of state interest beyond the reach of international law.                69
Indeed, recent decisions by supreme and constitutional courts in Germany, Britain and Russia             
have explicitly reserved the ultimate say in any case before the ECtHR that touches on domestic                
rights and constitutional sovereignty, thereby weakening the Court’s authority. In ​R v.            70
Horncastle & Others (2009), for example, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom agreed that               
it is required to “take into account” any judgment of the ECtHR but held that it possesses the                  
ultimate authority to decline to follow Strasbourg decisions.  71
 
65 ​Joan Fitzpatrick, “Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights,” ​European Journal of 
International Law​ 14, no 2 (2003): 242, ​https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/14.2.241​.  
66 Mokhtar, "Human Rights Obligations,” 78. 
67 Mike Burstein, "The Will to Enforce: An Examination of the Political Constraints upon a Regional Court of 
Human Rights," ​Berkeley Journal of International Law​ 24, no. 2 (2006): 424, 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol24/iss2/2​.  
68 ​Ibid​,  425.  
69  Stefan Kadelbach and David Roth-Isigkeit, “The Right to Invoke Rights as a Limit to Sovereignty - Security 
Interests, State of Emergency and Review of UN Sanctions by Domestic Courts under the European Convention of 
Human Rights,” ​Nordic Journal of International Law​ 86, no. 3 (2017): 3.  
70 German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 14 October 2004, Judgment, BVerfge 111, 307 at 329; Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, uksc, 9 December 2009; R v Horncastle, Judgment, [2009] uksc 14, § 11; 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, ccrf, 26 February 2010, Case No. 4-P, Applications of A.A. 
Doroshok, A.E. Kot, and E.Y. Fedotova, Judgment, § 3.3.  
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The question of human rights in the context of national security has long been stagnant as a                 
result of its stalemate with state sovereignty, arguably the most fundamental principle of the              
global system. Empowering international bodies to investigate and prosecute human rights           
violations caused by national security measures would threaten the hierarchy of the Westphalian             
international order, wherein ultimate sovereignty over state affairs trumps more idealistic           
pursuits of international justice. Consequently, most recent scholarship in this area defers on the              
question of human rights to the principle of sovereignty or vaguely alludes to the theoretical               
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CHAPTER II:  




A. Three Coups and the Republic 
 
The Republic of Turkey was created in 1923 after a four-year war of independence, led by the                 
Turkish National Movement against British, French, Greek, and Italian troops occupying the            
fallen Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I. Under the leadership of military               72
commander Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the new Turkish nation-state abolished the absolute           
monarchy of the Ottoman sultanate and established in its place the Grand National Assembly of               
Turkey. Kemal, heralded as the founder of the Republic, established a state ideology based on               73
secularism, democracy, the rule of law, popular sovereignty and the separation of powers.             74
However, though the ​Six Arrows of Kemalism have been the sacrosanct ideology of the state for                
much of Turkey’s history, in recent years the paradigm has been criticized as a top-down,               
elite-defined “hindrance to democracy and public participation.” Though neither Kemalism nor           75
Turkey’s political history will be given a detailed analysis here, the fundamental tension between              
the “secularist establishment” - generally thought to include the military top brass, the upper              
levels of the bureaucracy and the judiciary, and established political parties like the Republican              
Peoples Party (​Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, ​CHP) - and the neo-Ottoman Islamist identity of the              
AKP is critical to understanding the attempted coup of July 2016 and the mass purges that                
followed.  
 
72 ​Paul C. Helmreich, ​From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 
1919-1920 ​(Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1974).  
73 ​Alexander Lyon Macfie, ​The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923 ​(London: Routledge, 2014), 197.  
74 Ayla Göl, “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular,” ​Third World Quarterly​ 30, no. 4 (2009): 806, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590902867383​. 
75 Menderes Çınar, “Turkey’s Transformation under the ​AKP​ Rule,” ​The Muslim World​ 96 (July 2006): 471, 
http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/38257/bilkent-research-paper.pdf?sequence=1​.  The ‘Six 
Arrows’ of Kemalism are: Republicanism (​Cumhuriyetçilik​), Nationalism (​Ulusçuluk​), Populism (​Halkçılık​), 
Statism (​Devletçilik​), Secularism (​Laiklik​), and Revolutionism (​Devrimcilik​). For further background on the Six 
Arrows, see Hikmet Bila, ​Sosyal Demokrat Süreç içinde CHP ve sonrasi ​(The Republican Peoples’ Party in the 
Social Democratic Process and its Aftermath), Istanbul 1987. 
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Similarly critical is Turkey’s unique relationship with ​coup d’etats, ​emanating from the power             
Kemalism bequeathed on the military as ‘the guardians’ of Turkey’s secular democracy. ​Since              76
the Republic’s founding in 1923, the Turkish Armed Forces have overthrown three elected             
governments, launching successful coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The first coup resulted in the               
purging of more than 500 judges and public prosecutors, 1,400 academics, the arrests of the the                
Chief of the General Staff, the President, and the Prime Minister, and the executions by hanging                
of the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs. The subsequent ‘coup by memorandum’ in              77
1971 followed a decade of increasingly violent social unrest and economic instability. In             
response to the government’s parliamentary stalemate on widespread demands for social and            
financial reform, the Chief of the General Staff sent a memorandum to the prime minister               
threatening that the military would “exercise its constitutional duty” to intervene and restore             
order. The prime minister resigned hours later, and the military elite selected and installed a               78
‘caretaker government’ in its place. In less than a decade, military generals again intervened              79
with a third and particularly brutal coup, which resulted in the dissolution of Turkish Parliament,               
the revocation of the Constitution, the stripping of citizenships of more than 14,000 people,              
forced disappearances and mass arrests of more than 650,000 people, the executions by death              
penalty of more than 500 people, another 200 people killed by torture in custody, and widespread                
restrictions on the press.  80
 
Serious social unrest and the series of government overthrows together resulted in repeated             
periods of ​de facto military rule in Turkey, with martial law acting as a precursor to states of                  
emergency. Though a single authoritative definition of ‘martial law’ does not exist , it is              81
generally defined as the administration of law by military forces when civilian law enforcement              
agencies are unable to maintain public order and safety. Martial law was imposed for              82
twenty-nine months in 1971 and applied again in December 1978, initially on 14 of 67 provinces                
and extended to 20 provinces by 1980. A state of emergency regime was then implemented in                83
76 Gerassimos Karabelias, “The Military Institution, Ataturk’s Principles, and Turkey’s Sisyphean Quest for 
Democracy,” ​Middle Eastern Studies​ 45, no. 1 (January 2009): 59, ​https://www.jstor.org/stable/40262642​. 
77 “Turkey commemorates victims of 1960 coup,” ​TRT World, ​May 26, 2016, 
https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/may-27-1960-coup-against-democracy-113681  
78 “Timeline: A history of Turkish coups,” ​Al Jazeera, ​July 15, 2016, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html​.  
79 ​Ibid.  
80 “Turkey’s 1980 coup facts,” ​Hurriyet Daily News, ​April 4, 2012, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-1980-coup-facts-17628  
81 William Feldman, “Theories of Emergency Powers: A Comparative Analysis of American Martial Law and the 
French State of Siege,” ​Cornell International Law Journal​ 38, no. 3 (2005): 1022, 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1666&context=cilj​.  
82 “​Martial law” entry in the Legal Information Institution, Cornell Law School, available online at: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/martial_law​.  
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the country’s predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, beginning in July 1987 and             
ending in late 2002 for a total of fifteen years. Importantly, Turkey’s history of repeated               
emergency regimes has allowed the executive to gradually and permanently expand the powers             
of the government at the expense of human rights and civil liberties.  
 
Repeated emergency periods of exceptional rule have fundamentally shaped the relationship           
between national security and human rights in Turkey. The concept and language of ‘national              
security’ was in fact only introduced into the constitution and national legislation after the 1960               
coup, a shift from perceptions of security previously rooted in ‘defense’ from external threats.              84
The National Security Council (NSC) was also borne out of the 1960 coup: formally established               
by the 1961 Constitution, it was created by the new military rulers as a “forum to share their                  
views with civilian authorities” or more aptly, as a tool necessary to maintaining the military’s               
political power and influence even after a civilian government had been elected.  85
 
Indeed, after each overthrow and subsequent period of exceptional rule, the powers of the              
government and the military grew. After the 1971 coup, the military elite amended 35 regular               
articles of the constitution and added nine temporary articles, all of which “aimed to reinforce the                
powers of the government against threats to national unity, public order, and national security.”              86
Constitutional amendments also increased the authority of the Minister of Defense and enhanced             
the powers of the military members of the NSC. Civil liberties were simultaneously stripped, as               87
were the functions of the judiciary: restrictions were placed on the press, unions, and              
universities, while civilian administrative courts lost the ability to review the actions of military              
personnel. Special courts were created to deal with “dissent”, trying over 3,000 people in only               88
five years before being declared unconstitutional and abolished in 1976. Similarly, the generals             89
behind the 1980 takeover created the 1982 Constitution, which further expanded the powers of              
the military establishment by increasing the authority of the NSC relative to the Cabinet.   90
 
Turkey’s unique history of coup d’etats and repeated periods of emergency rule are critical to our                
purposes here for two central reasons. First, as outlined above, periods of exceptional rule had               
permanent impacts on the Turkey’s legal and political apparatus: emergency measures were            
codified into Turkish law and embedded into permanent national security structures of the state,              
84 ​Betul Urhan and Seyit Celik, “Perceptions of ‘National Security’ in Turkey and Their Impacts on the Labor 
Movement and Trade Union Activities,” ​European Journal of Turkish Studies​ (2010): 1,  ​http://ejts.revues.org/4333​.  
85 George S. Harris, “Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960-1980,” ​Turkish Studies​ 12, no. 2 (2011): 204, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.573181​.  
86 Ibid, ​206.  
87 ​Ibid, ​206.  
88 ​Ibid, ​206. 
89 Kerim Yildiz and Susan Breau, ​The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict 
Mechanisms​ (London: Routledge, 2010), 11.  
90 ​Ibid​, 210. 
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and several key amendments made to the original constitution during or as a result of emergency                
situations increasingly jeopardized core rights and freedoms owed to the citizenry. Second, it is              
critical to underscore that modern Turkey was founded with a fundamental tension between the              
military and the executive by design. The constitution placed the duty with the military to keep                
the government in check if it strays from the foundational principles of Kemalist secular              
democracy. Far from being unprecedented, the failed military coup against President Recep            91
Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2016 must be understood as part of the country’s tradition of military                
intervention in government and longtime mistrust between elements of the state. 
 
B. Dark July: Executive Powers and Exceptional Rule 
 
The Turkish government was almost overthrown for a fourth time on July 15, 2016, when a                
faction of the military attempted to seize power. Rebel officers hijacked two dozen F-16s,              
detained and held hostage senior military leaders, blocked major roads and bridges, and occupied              
key institutions including state-run media facilities and international airports. Parliament was           92
bombed, the president’s guards were ambushed by a helicopter sent to capture Erdoğan, and by               
morning more than 260 people had been killed. In a public statement rebel soldiers forced a                93
state news anchor to read on national television, the coupists cited AKP corruption and support               
of terrorism, the destruction of the country’s democratic institutions, and a lack of respect for               
human rights as justification for their actions, lamenting that: “The secular and democratic rule              
of law has been virtually eliminated.”  94
 
Within five days of the failed putsch, President Erdoğan declared a nationwide state of              
emergency for a period of ninety days. He announced the state of emergency in a televised                95
address given at the presidential palace in Ankara, stating that it was necessary “in order to                
remove swiftly all the elements of the terrorist organization involved in the coup attempt.”              96
Erdogan attributed the coup to Turkish Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, a former AKP ally who               
has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999, and the ​Hizmet movement he had               
91 Ozan Varol, “The Turkish ‘model’ of civil-military relations,” ​International Journal of Constitutional Law​ 11, no. 
3 (September 2013): 741, ​https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot023​.  
92 ​Dexter Filkins, “Turkey’s Thirty-Year Coup,” ​New Yorker,​ October 17, 2016, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/17/turkeys-thirty-year-coup  
93 ​Ibid​. 
94 Ibid.  
95 “Turkey Declares ‘State of Emergency’ after Failed Coup,” ​Al Jazeera​, 21 July 2016, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/erdogan-declares-stateemergency-turkey-160720203646218.html​.  
96 Stuart Williams, Fulya Ozerkan and Frank Zeller, “Erdogan declares three-month state of emergency in Turkey,” 
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developed, which Turkey officially designated a terrorist organization in May 2016. The            97
decision to declare a state of emergency was made pursuant to Article 120 of the Turkish                
Constitution and Article 3(1)(b) of the State of Emergency Act (Law No. 2935), both of which                
allow for emergency measures to be invoked in the case of emergencies resulting from              
widespread acts of violence or serious public disorder. Per its obligations as a states party to the                 
ECHR, the government submitted its notification of a state of emergency to the Council of               
Europe on July 21. The following section will briefly survey the government’s actions in the               
wake of the failed coup and analyze the domestic and international legal bases for such. 
 
Empowered by the declared state of emergency, the government embarked on a swift and              
widespread crackdown. The numbers are staggering: according to a CNN report published within             
five days of the failed coup, the licenses of 21,738 teachers had been revoked, 2,745 judges and                 
prosecutors had been detained, 1,577 university deans were asked to resign, nearly 50 journalists              
were arrested, and 24 radio and television companies had been shut down. 50,000 people were               98
fired or suspended, most from the Prime Minister’s office, government bodies, and the state              
broadcaster, while 118 generals and admirals were detained and stripped of their rank.             99
According to the state-run Anadolu Agency, the authorities suspended 8,777 Ministry of Interior             
personnel, including thirty governors, and 100 Turkish intelligence service personnel. More           100
than 16,000 people were detained on suspicion of involvement with the coup by the end of the                 
month, while emergency decrees issued on July 21 resulted in the closure of 35 health               
institutions and medical organisations, 1,043 private education institutions, 1,229 foundations          
and associations, 19 unions and 15 foundation schools due to alleged links to the coup.  101
 
The crackdown intensified in the weeks and months that followed. ​Turkey Purge, ​a website              
established by a grassroots group of Turkish journalists to track the AKP’s “campaign of              
political repression” in the wake of the failed coup, has extensively documented the final impacts               
of the emergency decrees. The final numbers are staggering: at the time of writing, 170, 372                
people have been dismissed; 142, 874 have been detained; 81, 417 have been arrested; 6,021               
academics have lost their jobs; 4,463 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed; 3,003 schools,              
97 The movement is generally described as a transnational Islamic social movement based on Gulen’s religious 
teachings. It is classified as the ‘Fethullah Gulenist Terror Organisation’ in Turkey, commonly known by its Turkish 
acronym FETÖ (​Fethullahci Teror Orgutu​). Suspected members of the organization are often simply referred to as 
‘Gulenists’. ​See​ “Turkey labels former Erdogan ally’s group as terrorists,” ​The Guardian, ​May 31, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/31/turkey-labels-ex-erdogan-ally-fethullah-gulen-group-terrorists​.  
98 Isil Sariyuce and Angela Dewan,“Turkey declares three-month state of emergency,” ​CNN, ​July 20, 2016, 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/europe/turkey-failed-coup-attempt/index.html​.  
99 ​Ibid​. 
100 Fatma Bülbül, “Turkey: At least 8,000 officials suspended after coup attempt,” ​Anadolu Agency, ​July 18, 2016, 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-at-least-8-000-officials-suspended-after-coup-attempt/610202​.  
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dormitories and universities have been shut down; 319 journalists have been arrested; and 189              
media outlets have been shut down.   102
 
 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ON SoEs 
 
A. Turkish Law 
 
Turkey is not unfamiliar with states of emergency: as outlined above, the Republic or parts of it                 
have been under some form of extraordinary rule for much of its 94-year history. The               
predecessor of today’s SoE regime was ​the Law for the Establishment of Public Order (​Takrir-i               
Sükûn Kanunu)​, enacted on March 4, 1925, shortly after the establishment of the Republic.              103
This law classified social dissent and political opposition movements as threats to national             
security, and became “a tool...for forestalling possible social opposition and containing all            
political opposition, including the press.” It also empowered the government to ban and             104
dissolve any publication or organization that posed a threat to the country’s “social order, peace,               
calm, security and safety.” In 1971, the government passed Law No. 1488, which used the               105
term ‘national security’ to limit the right of association established by Article 29 of the 1961                
Constitution, and the right per Article 46 to establish trade unions. Law No. 1488 also               106
expanded the scope of Article 24, adding to the list of criteria allowing for the proclamation of                 
martial law. The Martial Law Act (Law No. 1402), adopted the same year, explicitly empowered               
martial law commanders to restrict or completely suspend constitutional rights and civil liberties             
at their discretion.  
 
The government’s authority to declare a state of emergency (​Olağanüstü Hal, ​OHAL) is derived              
from Articles 120 and 121 of the Turkish Constitution. Article 120 permits the President of the                107
Republic to “declare a state of emergency in one or more regions or throughout the country for a                  
period not exceeding six months” in the event of “serious indications of widespread acts of               
violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order established by the Constitution or               
of fundamental rights and freedoms, or serious deterioration of public order because of acts of               
102 “Turkey’s post-coup crackdown,” homepage of ​Turkey Purge​, available online at: ​https://turkeypurge.com/​.  
103  ​Urhan and Celik, “Perceptions of ‘National Security’,” 5. 
104 ​Ibid​, 5. 
105 Ibid​. 
106 ​Ibid​, 11.  
107 Article 119 also relates to states of emergency and procedures governing emergency rule, but only relates to 
emergencies on account of natural disaster, dangerous epidemic diseases or serious economic crises, issues that will 
not be addressed here.  
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violence.” Article 120 requires the President to convene a meeting of the Council of Ministers               108
and consult with the National Security Council prior to declaring the SoE.  
 
Article 121 of the Constitution sets out the rules of procedure governing emergency rule.              
According to this provision, the President is required to publish the decision in the Official               
Gazette (​T.C. Resmi Gazete​), thereby immediately notifying the public that emergency rule is in              
effect, and is further mandated to submit the declaration to the Turkish Grand National Assembly               
for approval. The Assembly has the authority to alter the duration of the SoE, extend the period                 
for a maximum of four months each time at the request of the Council of Ministers, or lift the                   
SoE if it sees fit. Article 121 further empowers the Council of Ministers under the direction of                 109
the President to issue “decrees having force of law on matters necessitated by the state of                
emergency.” Per Article 148(1) of the Turkish Constitution, emergency decrees cannot be            110
subject to appeal or review by the Constitutional Court: “No action shall be brought before the                
Constitutional Court alleging the unconstitutionality as to the form or substance of decrees             
having force of law, issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war.”   111
 
It is worth mentioning a curious development in the attitude of the Constitutional Court (​Anayasa               
Mahkemesi​, AYM) towards emergency decrees. In a landmark decision in 1991, the AYM held              
that the SoE is a legal regime regulated by the Constitution and therefore cannot be beyond the                 
scope of judicial scrutiny. Despite the prohibition on constitutional reviews of emergency            112
decrees set out by Article 148(1), the AYM reasoned that it nonetheless possesses the authority               
to determine whether decree laws in fact meet the criteria set out by Articles 120 and 121. That                  
is, the AYM can examine whether decrees are sufficiently within the bounds of proportionality,              
temporariness, and geographical restriction required by the Constitution; the AYM can only            
assess the constitutionality of a decree if it does not meet the criteria necessary to render it a                  
legitimate decree. The AYM further widened the scope of its jurisdiction over SoEs in 2003,               113
when it ruled that the power of the government to issue emergency decree laws was subject to                 
judicial limitations afforded by the constitutional authority of Articles 121 and 122.  114
 
However, the AYM has since reversed the aforementioned precedent, deviating from its own             
jurisprudence and abandoning previous assertions that it possesses the right to rule on the              
108 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, available online at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html​, Article 120.  
109 ​Ibid, ​Article 121.  
110 ​Ibid​.  
111 ​Ibid, ​Article 148(1). 
112 Serkan Köybaşı, “Developments in Turkish Constitutional Law: The Year 2016 in Review,” ​Blog of the 
International Journal of Constitutional Law​, December 11, 2017, 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/12/turkey-2016-review/​.  
113 ​Ibid​. 
114 E.2003/28, K.2003/42 
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legitimacy of emergency decrees. In the fall of 2016, the CHP appealed for the annulment of four                 
emergency decrees (Decree Nos. 668, 669, 670, and 671) on the grounds that they violated the                
constitution; the party applied to the AYM to annul 13 more emergency decrees in June 2018.                115
The AYM rejected every application on the basis of a strict interpretation of Article 148(1),               
concluding that the original writers of the Constitution had intended it to completely prohibit              
judicial scrutiny, a reversal of its own previous case law. As President of the AYM, Zühtü                116
Arslan, stated: “Constitution Article No. 148 explicitly states that the statutory decrees issued             
during the State of Emergency cannot be taken to the Constitutional Court. Departing from this               
point, the AYM ruled that it doesn’t have the authority to review the statutory decrees put into                 
effect during the State of Emergency. We cannot be expected to step outside the constitutional               
borders.”  117
 
With the AYM’s newfound deference on emergency decrees in mind, it is necessary to highlight               
the increasing levels of influence the executive has exercised over the court. In 2010, for               
example, the powers and structure of the AYM were altered via constitutional referendum, the              
result of which was the appointment of six judges to the court chosen personally by President                
Erdoğan. A second constitutional referendum, controversially held during the SoE period in            118
April 2017, granted the president the power to handpick twelve of the AYM’s fifteen judges.               119
Moreover, two AYM judges, Alparslan Altan and Erdal Tercan, were detained within            
twenty-four hours of the attempted coup, later dismissed from the court and permanently barred              
from the judicial profession due to their alleged ties to FETO. Altan and Tercan were quickly                120
115 “Turkey’s Constitutional Court rejects CHP application to cancel 13 gov’t decrees,” ​Stockholm Center for 
Freedom,​ July 1, 2018, 
https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-constitutional-court-rejects-chp-application-to-cancel-13-govt-decrees/​.  
116 Selin Esen, “Judicial Control of Decree Laws in Emergency Regimes - A Self-Destruction Attempt by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court?”  Blog of the International Association of Constitutional Law, December 19, 2016, 
https://iaclaidc.wordpress.com/2016/12/19/judicial-control-of-the-decree-laws-in-emergency-regimes-a-self-destruct
ion-attempt-by-the-turkish-constitutional-court/​.  
117 ​“Head of top court in Turkey confirms they don’t have authority to review statutory decrees,” ​Stockholm Center 
for Freedom, ​April 26, 2017, 
https://stockholmcf.org/head-of-top-court-in-turkey-confirms-they-dont-have-authority-to-review-statutory-decrees/​.  
118 Köybaşı, “Turkish Constitutional Law.” For more information, ​see​ Law on Establishment and Rules of 
Procedures of the Constitutional Court (Law No. 6216, March 2011).  
119 “Turkey referendum: What happened and what comes next,” ​CNN​, April 18, 2017, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/17/europe/turkey-referendum-explainer/index.html​.  
120 The Court was granted the power to dismiss its own members by Decree No. 667, which it did in this case largely 
on the basis of social network information indicating that Altan and Tercan had a connection to the Gulen network. 
Significantly, as Olcay (2017) highlights, the Court determined that Decree No. 667 did not require ‘membership in’ 
or ‘affiliation with’ a terror group but that ‘adherence to’ or a ‘connection with’ it were sufficient grounds for 
dismissal.” ​See​ Tarik Olcay, “Firing Bench-mates: The Human Rights and Rule of Law Implications of the Turkish 
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replaced by two new justices chosen directly by the president. Finally, Erdoğan recently             121
publicly rebuked the AYM following its decision to release two jailed journalists, stating that he               
does not “abide by the decision or respect it”, calling the decision one “against the country and                 
against its people” and threatening the future existence of the court: “The court’s future is in                
doubt if it were to make another such ruling… I hope the Constitutional Court will not try to                  
repeat this in a way that would call into question its existence and its legitimacy.” It would                 122
certainly appear that the court’s sudden reversal on this issue is the result of political pressure                
and a stacked deck of judges chosen personally by the president. 
 
Returning to the governance of the SoE regime in Turkey’s domestic legal framework, the              
specific provisions of emergency rule are ceded by the Constitution to the State of Emergency               
Law (SEL)(Law No. 2935), which was passed under the State of Emergency Act in October               
1983. Article 4 of the SEL allows the President and the Council of Ministers to issue decrees                 
having the force of law “without complying with the restrictions and procedures laid down in               
Article 91 of the Constitution” during states of emergency. The restrictions and procedures it              123
refers to are the “fundamental rights, individual rights, and duties included in the First and               
Second Chapter of the Second Part of the Constitution and the political rights and duties listed in                 
the Fourth Chapter” which, per Article 91, cannot be regulated by decree - except during periods                
of martial law and states of emergency. Article 15 of the Constitution expands on this right of                 124
the government to restrict rights and liberties under certain circumstances, stating:  
 
“In times of war, mobilization, martial law, or state of emergency, the exercise of              
fundamental rights and freedoms can be partially or entirely suspended, or measures            
may be taken, to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate               
the guarantees embodied in the Constitution, provided that obligations under          
international law are not violated. 
 
Even under the circumstances indicated in the first paragraph, the individual’s right to             
life, and the integrity of his material and spiritual entity can be inviolable except where               
death occurs through lawful act of warfare and execution of death sentences; no one              
may be compelled to reveal his religion, conscience, thought or opinion nor be accused              
121 Maria Haimerl, “The Turkish Constitutional Court under the Amended Turkish Constitution,” ​Verfassungsblog​, 
January 27, 2017, 
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-turkish-constitutional-court-under-the-amended-turkish-constitution/​.  
122 Charlotte Beale,“Turkish President Erdogan threatens court’s ‘existence’ after it releases two journalists,” ​The 
Independent, ​March 12, 2016, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-threatens-courts-existence-after-it-releases-two-journali
sts-a6927421.html​.  
123 State of Emergency Act (October 1983): State of Emergency Law No. 2935. Published in the Official Gazette on 
27 October 1983, No. 18204. Accessed online in English at:  ​https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/6974​.  
124 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html​, Article 91.  
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on account of them; offences and penalties may not be made retroactive, nor may              
anyone be held guilty until so proven by a court judgment.”  125
 
Under SoEs provoked by widespread violence or threats to the public order, the powers granted               
to the government are set out under Chapter Three, Article 11 of the SEL. The government may                 
implement a wide range of measures via emergency decree, several of which plainly restrict              
fundamental human rights and civil liberties: (b) prohibits any kind of assembly or procession;              
(c) authorizes officials to search persons, their vehicles, or property; (e) prohibits, or imposes the               
obligation to require permission for, the publication (including issuance of reprints and editions)             
and distribution of newspapers, magazines, brochures, books, etc.; prohibits the importation and            
distribution of publications published or reprinted outside regions declared to be under a state of               
emergency, and allows for the confiscation of books, magazines, newspapers, brochures, posters            
and other publications of which publication or dissemination has been banned; (f) controls and, if               
deemed necessary, restricts or prohibits every kind of broadcasting and dissemination of words,             
writings, pictures, films, records, sound and image bands (tapes); (h) controls and, if deemed              
necessary, suspends or prohibits the exhibition of all kinds of plays and films; (m) prohibits,               
postpones, or imposes a requirement to obtain permission for, assemblies and demonstrations in             
both enclosed and open spaces; regulates the time and place of permitted assemblies and              
demonstrations; and allows for the supervision, and if deemed necessary dispersal, of all kinds of               
permitted assemblies; and (p) allows for the planning and execution of operations, in so far as                
they may be necessary, beyond the borders of Turkey to capture or incapacitate persons who,               
having carried out disruptive actions in Turkey, have sought refuge in a neighbouring country.  126
 
Since the SoE came in effect July 2016, the Turkish government has issued 32 emergency               
decrees implementing virtually all of the aforementioned measures. Further, the decrees have            127
allowed for more than 300 amendments to be made to more than 150 separate laws. Human                128
rights organizations have criticized the decrees as violating both Turkish and international law.             
For example, the Turkish Human Rights Association (​İnsan Hakları Derneği​, İHD) stated on             
July 28, 2016 that the decrees are “clearly incompatible with the Turkish Constitution Article 15,               
Clause 2… and even with the Articles of the Turkish Constitution concerning the decrees during               
125 Serap Yazici, “A Guide to the Turkish Public Law Order and Legal Research,” GlobalLex: NYU Hauser Global 
Law School Program,​ ​September 2006.  
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Turkey.html#_Historical_Background​.  
126 State of Emergency Act (October 1983): State of Emergency Law No. 2935. Published in the Official Gazette on 
27 October 1983, No. 18204. Accessed online in English at:  ​https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/6974 
Chapter III, Art. 11.  
127 “The State of Emergency has ended but urgent measures are now needed to reverse the roll back of human 
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emergency states.” The group pointed to the fact that the clauses of the decree share no                129
connection to the subject of and reason for the declared SoE. The UN Office of the High                 
Commissioner of Human Rights similarly found that several of the emergency decrees lack any              
connection to a national threat or public emergency. This issue will be explored in more depth                130
in the following section.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that neither the term ‘national security’ nor ‘state of emergency’                
are explicitly defined in Turkish law. The phrase ‘state of emergency’ lacks clarity in the               
legislation, but the legal and operational framework of such has been developed to some degree               
by the case law of the AYM and the ECtHR, as will be examined below. No definition of                  
national security, however, is clearly laid out, lacking in both the 1949 High Council of National                
Security and the 1962 Law of the NSC. While the amended 1983 Law of the NSC (Law No.                  131
2945) offers a broad definition - “The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order,              
national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural, and economic interests in international            
field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State” - its open-ended                  132
wording has been criticized as leaving the term open to subjective interpretations and arbitrary              
implementation, ripe for abuse.   133
 
Employing vague, easily manipulated terminology in this context is not an issue limited to              
Turkey: both concepts of ‘national security’ and ‘public emergencies’ remain ambiguous at the             
international level. The former is most often defined by a blend of both military and non-military                
characteristics that correspond roughly to the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power capabilities underpinning            
state sovereignty: freedom from military threat, foreign domination, or political coercion ; the            134
ability to preserve a nation’s physical integrity and territory, maintain international economic            
relations, preserve its institutions and governance from disruption, and control its borders ; and             135
the capacity of a nation to overcome multi-dimensional threats to the well-being of its people, its                
129 “The Decree Devised within the Scope of the Emergency State Law and Ignoring Human Rights and 
Fundamental Principles of Rule Of Law Should Be Urgently Revoked!”, press release issued by the Turkish Human 
Rights Association,  28 July 2016, 
http://ihd.org.tr/en/index.php/2016/07/28/the-decree-devised-within-the-scope-of-the-emergency-state-law-and-igno
ring-human-rights-and-fundamental-principles-of-rule-of-law-should-be-urgently-revoked/​.  
130 "Turkey: UN Report Details Extensive Human Rights Violations during Protracted State of Emergency," 
OHCHR, March 20, 2018, available online at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22853​.  
131 See Law. No. 129 of 11 December 1962, issued in accordance with Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution.  
132 See Law No. 2945 of 1 November 1983, issued in accordance with Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution.  
133 ​Urhan and Celik, “Perceptions of ‘National Security’ in Turkey,” 4.  
134 Joseph J. Romm, ​Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects​ (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1993), 122.  
135 Harold Brown,​ Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World​ (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1983), 281.  
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survival as a nation-state and its acquired values. ‘Public emergencies’ are defined in health              136 137
and humanitarian contexts as a “managerial term describing a state, demanding decision and             
follow-up in terms of extraordinary measures”; the World Health Organization (WHO) further            
defines a ‘state of emergency’ as something that “demands to be declared or imposed by               
somebody in authority… thus, it is usually defined in time and space, it requires threshold values                
to be recognized, and it implies rules of engagement and an exit strategy.” From a rights-based                138
perspective, however, the UN Human Rights Council has been criticized for making “no             
attempt” to provide a specific definition of or criterion for the term “public emergency”, leaving               
the term dangerously open to interpretation.  139
 
 
B. International Human Rights Law 
 
In the month following the failed coup, President Erdoğan submitted formal notice of Turkey’s              
intention to derogate from several of its human rights obligations under the ECHR and the               
ICCPR, respectively ratified in 1954 and 2003. As previously noted, both the ECHR and the               
ICCPR provide for the limited suspension of certain treaty obligations during emergency            
situations. Article 15(1) of the ECHR states that during times of war or other public emergency                
“any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this             
Convention to the extent strictly required to the exigencies of the situation, provided that such               
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” The            140
derogation clause of the ICCPR, Article 4(1), uses identical language, but adds that measures              
taken during times of emergency “must not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race,               
colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin.”  141
 
However, the derogation clauses of both treaties forbid the suspension of several core,             
fundamental rights. Both prohibit derogations from the right to life (Article 2 of the ECHR and                
Article 6 of the ICCPR), the right to be free from torture, including inhuman or degrading                
treatment or punishment (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR), the right to be free                   
from slavery and forced labour (Article 4 of the ECHR and Article 8 of the ICCPR), and the                  
136 Prabhakaran Paleri, ​National Security: Imperatives and Challenges​ (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008), 521. 
137 Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol," ​Political Science Quarterly​ 67, no. 4 (1952): 
149, doi:10.2307/2145138. 
138 Public Emergencies - Definitions: Glossary of Humanitarian Terms, World Health Organization, 
http://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/​.  
139 ​ Dominic McGoldrick, “The interface between public emergency powers and international law,” ​International 
Journal of Constitutional Law​ 2, no. 2 (April 2004): 392, ​https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/2.2.380​.  
140 ECHR, Article 15(1). 
141 ICCPR, Article 4(1). 
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prohibition of punishment without law (Article 7 of the ECHR and Article 15 of the ICCPR).                142
The ICCPR further recognizes the right to be free from imprisonment on the grounds of inability                
to fulfil a contractual obligation (Article 11), the right to recognition as a person before the law                 
(Article 16), and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18) as strictly                
non-derogable rights.  143
 
On July 21, 2016, Turkey notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn               
Jagland, of its intention to derogate from several obligations under the ECHR. As has become               144
its longtime habit in declaring derogations, Turkey failed to specify what articles would be              
subject to derogation, stating simply that “measures taken may involve derogation” from ECHR             
obligations. Turkey subsequently notified the Secretary General of the UN that it was invoking              145
Article 4 of the ICCPR, which entered into effect on August 2, 2016. In the notification letter                 
submitted to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon by Y. Halit Çevik, Permanent Representative             
of Turkey to the UN, Turkey declared its intention to derogate from thirteen articles of the                
ICCPR: the right to a remedy (Art. 2.3), liberty (Art. 9), the humane treatment of detainees (Art.                 
10), movement (Art. 12), safeguards against expulsion (Art. 13), fair trial (Art. 14), privacy and               
family (Art. 17), expression (Art. 19), assembly (Art. 21), association (Art. 22), political             
participation (Art. 25), equality and nondiscrimination (Art. 26), and minority rights (Art. 27).   146
 
For reference, after recent terrorist attacks killed 130 people in Paris, France derogated from only               
three ICCPR articles: the rights to liberty (Art. 9), movement (Art. 12), and privacy (Art. 17). In                 
fact, no states party aside from Turkey has suspended more than seven articles of the ICCPR                
during a state of emergency: Chile, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Nepal have each previously derogated             
from four articles, while Russia derogated from five in 1994 and Sri Lanka from seven in 2010.                




142 The full text of Article 7(1) reads: “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence 
was committed.” 
143 ICCPR, Articles 11, 16 and 18. 
144 Declaration contained in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Turkey, dated 21 July 2016, registered at 
the Secretariat General on 21 July 2016, available online in English at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations?p_auth=HC8HmHOm​.  
145 Martin Scheinin, “Turkey’s Derogation from the ECHR - What to Expect?” Blog of the ​European Journal of 
International Law, ​July 27, 2016, ​https://www.ejiltalk.org/turkeys-derogation-from-the-echr-what-to-expect/​.  
146 Reference: C.N.580.2016.TREATIES-IV.4 (Depositary Notification): 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.580.2016-Eng.pdf​.  
147 “Counter-Terrorism and Situations of Public Emergency,” UN Office of Drugs and Crime E4J University Module 
Series on Counter-Terrorism (2016), ​https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-7/key-issues/examples.html​.  
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i. The Derogation Clauses: Interpretation and Application 
 
The nature and scope of ECHR Article 15 has been further developed by ECtHR jurisprudence.               
Three major cases have dealt with the question of derogation: ​Lawless v. Ireland (1961), the               
Greek Case ​(1969), and ​Ireland v. United Kingdom ​(1978). In ​Lawless and ​Greek​, the ECtHR               
expanded on the definition of a ‘public emergency’, determining that it must possess the              
following four characteristics: it must be actual and imminent; its effects must involve the whole               
nation; the continuance of the organized life the community must be threatened; and the crisis or                
danger must be exceptional in that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the              
Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, “are plainly inadequate.”   148
 
Though the ICCPR lacks a judicial organ akin to the ECtHR, the interpretation and application of                
its derogation clause has been developed by two general comments adopted by the UN Human               
Rights Committee, General Comments No. 5 and 29, as well as by the Siracusa Principles and                
the Paris Minimum Standards. The UN Human Rights Committee first adopted a brief one-page              
commentary in 1981, emphasizing that any measures taken under Article 4 must be             
“exceptional” and “temporary”, insofar as that they “may only last as long as the life of the                 
nation concerned is threatened.” Subsequently, in September 1984, the International          149
Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law within the International Law Association             
completed the development of a set of minimum standards during states of emergency, called the               
Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency. Based on a               150
four-year study of the international monitoring of SoEs, the Paris Minimum Standards were             
developed to help governments, international monitoring bodies and NGOs understand the           
meaning, scope and effect of their treaty obligations and enable more effective protections of              
basic human rights.   151
 
The following year, in April 1985, the American Association for the International Commission             
of Jurists (AAICJ) published the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions             
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Recognizing that SoEs are “one of               
the main instruments employed by governments to repress and deny the fundamental rights and              
freedoms of peoples”, the AAICJ similarly sought to more sharply define permissible grounds             
148 ​The Greek Case​ (3321-23/67; 3344/67) 5.11.1969, para 153. 
149 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), ​CCPR General Comment No. 5: Article 4 (Derogations)​, 31 July 1981, 
available at:​ ​http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883ff1b.html​ at para. 3.  
150 Chaired by Richard B. Lillich , with members from Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Nepal, the Netherlands, 
Nigeria, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia.  
151 Richard B. Lillich, “The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency,” ​The 
American Journal of International Law​ 79, no. 4 (October 1985): 1073, ​https://www.jstor.org/stable/2201848​.  
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for rights limitations and derogations. No. 6 and No. 7 of the Siracusa Principle reaffirmed that                152
measures taken must be directly connected to the reason for the emergency, respectively stating:              
“No limitation referred to in the Covenant shall be applied for any purpose other than that for                 
which it has been prescribed” and “No limitation shall be applied in an arbitrary manner.”               153
With respect to the aforementioned element of necessity, Principle No. 10 determined that             
derogation measures must fulfill four criteria: be based on one of the grounds justifying              
limitations recognized by the relevant article of the Covenant; respond to a pressing public or               
social need; pursue a legitimate aim; and be proportionate to that aim. Principle No. 11 further                
expanded on the element of proportionality, noting that: “States shall use no more restrictive              
means than are required for the achievement of the purpose of the limitation.”  154
 
In 2001, the UN Human Rights Committee adopted a more lengthy and rigorous commentary on               
emergency derogations. General Comment No. 29, adopted in August 2001, added further            
dimension to a key phrase of Article 4, which required that derogation measures be “strictly               
required by the exigencies of the situation.” According to General Comment No. 29, the              155
necessity of measures taken is measured by the duration, geographical coverage, and material             
scope of the SoE and the according proportionality of derogation measures. General Comment             156
No. 29 further emphasizes that states parties are under a dual obligation when invoking the right                
to derogate from the Covenant: they must first justify how the situation meets the threshold of                
constituting a “threat to the life of the nation”, and second must sufficiently demonstrate how all                
derogation measures taken were strictly required by the situation at hand. Finally, the UN              157
Human Rights Committee emphasized that Article 4 should not be interpreted as an ‘escape              
clause’ allowing for violations of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law.             158
Of importance to the current situation in Turkey is the clear instruction in General Comment No.                
152 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4672bc122.html​ 5. 
153 Ibid​, 3.  
154 ​Ibid​. 
155 ICCPR, Article 4(1). 
156 ​UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fd1f.html​ para. 4.   
157 ​Ibid​, para. 5.  
158 ​See​ United Republic of Tanzania (1992), CCPR/C/79/Add.12, paragraph 7; Dominican Republic (1993), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.18, paragraph 4; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1995), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.55, paragraph 23; Peru (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.67, paragraph 11; Bolivia (1997), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.74, paragraph 14; Colombia (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.76, paragraph 25; Lebanon (1997), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.78, paragraph 10; Uruguay (1998), CCPR/C/79/Add.90, paragraph 8; Israel (1998), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, paragraph 11.  
 
 
TURKEY UNDER EMERGENCY RULE 
37 
29 against the deviation from fundamental principles of the rule of law, including fair trial, due                
process, and the presumption of innocence.   159
 
In sum, there are three overarching principles underpinning emergency derogations from human            
rights treaties: the principles of exceptional threat, which renders extraordinary measures           
necessary; the principle of proportionality, which requires that measures correspond in           
magnitude to the nature and scope of the emergency; and the principle of non-derogability,              
which protects fundamental peremptory norms even in emergencies. The following section           160
will first identify the human rights impacts of the SoE, particularly those connected to              
counterterrorism-related emergency decrees, and will subsequently assess whether Turkey’s         

















159 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fd1f.html​ para. 11.  
160 Further, as first argued by Oraá (1999), the derogation clauses of the ECHR and the ICCPR have advanced 
another two principles governing human rights during emergencies: the principle of non-discrimination and the 
principle of procedure, that is, proclamation and notification. ​See​ Jaime Oraá, "The Protection of Human Rights in 
Emergency Situations under Customary International Law," in ​The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour 










CHAPTER III:  
Countering Terror or Criminalizing Dissent?  
Human Rights under the State of Emergency in Turkey 
 
 
“Freedom of expression is the matrix, the indispensable 
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” 





Since the SoE went into effect in July 2016, Turkey has issued thirty-two emergency decrees               
with the force of law. The legal text of each decree and their corresponding explanatory notes                161
unanimously cite ‘fighting terrorism’ and ‘protecting national security’ as the stated aims of the              
measures contained therein. As a result, the SoE has significantly broadened the domestic             
counterterrorism powers of the Turkish government by facilitating the expedited passage of new             
terror-related legislation, numerous amendments to existing laws, and the restructuring of key            
security, police, and intelligence bodies. Turkey’s counterterrorism powers have been further           
expanded by the government’s systematic use of the SoE to weaken the rule of law and empower                 
the executive vis-à-vis both the parliament and the judiciary, allowing for increasingly punitive             
and politicized terrorism prosecutions.  
 
As explored in the previous section, the derogation clauses of the ECHR and the ICCPR allow                
for the suspension of certain rights and freedoms during emergencies with two key caveats: the               
nature and scope of rights derogations must be proportionate to the declared reason for the               
emergency, and measures taken to that effect must be strictly required by the exigencies of the                
situation. The derogation clauses further draw a clear line between derogable and non-derogable             
rights, the latter of which must never be suspended even during SoEs. Turkey’s string of               
161 “The State of Emergency has ended but urgent measures are now needed to reverse the rollback of human rights,” 
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emergency decrees has raised serious questions in both regards. The following section will first              
assess how Turkey’s emergency counterterrorism-related measures have impacted human rights,          
and will subsequently examine whether these measures meet the aforementioned tests required            
by the derogation clauses. 
 
 
A.  Freedoms of Expression, Association, and Assembly 
 
Turkish nationals have a right to freedoms of expression, association, and assembly under both              
domestic and international law. Under Article 26 of the Turkish constitution, “Everyone has the              
right to express and disseminate his thought and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or                 
through other media, individually or collectively.” Article 10(1) of the ECHR and Article             162
19(2) of the ICCPR define freedom of expression as the “right to hold opinions and the freedom                 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and              
regardless of frontiers.” Freedom of expression is not limited to freedom of the press but               163
extends to political speech, commercial speech, and artistic expression; in 2011, the UN Human              
Rights Committee reaffirmed that all forms of expression are protected, including spoken,            
written, and sign language, expressions made orally, in writing or in print, and non-verbal              
expressions like art. Moreover, the ECtHR has held that expressions protected by Article 10              164
“include not only ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive...but also those              
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.”   165
 
The growing tendency to use ‘counterterrorism’ as a convenient pretext to limit freedoms of              
expression, association and assembly is particularly evident in Turkey. The country’s longtime            
penchant for systematic ‘silencing policies’ is made clear by ECtHR case law: out of 619               
judgments in which the Court has found a violation of the right to freedom of expression, 258                 
have concerned Turkey. Methods previously used to repress and criminalize dissenting           166
expression in Turkey have included the forced dismissal of journalists critical of the government              
and its policies; administrative sanctions and criminal investigations into media outlets and their             
162 Article 6, Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html​. 
163 ECHR, Article 10(1) and ICCPR, Article 19(2).  
164 UN Human Rights Committee (2011), General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of opinion and 
expression, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, ​http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf​.  
165 ​Handyside v. the United Kingdom​ (5493/72) [1976] ECHR 5 (7 December 1976), para. 49.  
166 Data reflects the period between 1959 and 2015. It is worth noting that the member state with the next highest 
number of violations of Article 10 has 34 violations. ​See​ Violations by Article and Respondent State, 1959-2015, 
European Court of Human Rights, ​https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2015_ENG.pdf​.  
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owners; forced removal of internet content; the blocking of websites and social media platforms,              
and general restraints on publication.   167
 
However, under the 2016 to 2018 SoE period, these practices have shifted from general              
government censorship to measures more strongly associated with ‘counterterrorism’. Cases          168
concerning freedom of expression have increasingly been viewed as criminal offences under the             
Law on Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey (Law No. 3713), commonly known as the              
Anti-Terror Act, in conjunction with the Turkish Criminal Code (​Türk Ceza Kanunu​, TCK).             
Persons with superficial associations to the Gulen network, for instance those with children             
enrolled in a Gulen-linked preparatory school, have been charged with ‘membership in a terrorist              
organisation’ under Article 2 of the Anti-Terror Act, despite not holding a place within its               
hierarchical structure. Article 220(6) of the TCK similarly allows for a broad interpretation of              169
‘membership’, enabling prosecutions for “committing crimes on behalf of an armed organization            
without being a member of that organisation.” Writers and journalists that have written             170
positive articles about Fethullah Gulen and his movement have further been charged with ‘aiding              
and abetting an armed organization’ under Article 220(7) and Article 314 of the TCK. 
 
The most common article used to criminalize dissent is Article 7(2) of the Anti-Terror Law,               
which defines ‘propaganda’ as “portraying a terrorist organization’s use of force, violence or             
methods including threats as legitimate or praising them or inciting people to use these              
methods.” This offence is especially dangerous for journalists, reporters, and other members of             171
the media, as the penalty is aggravated by one half “if this crime is committed through means of                  
mass media.” Under Article 6 of the Anti-Terror Act, persons who “print or publish              172
declarations or announcements of terrorist organisations shall be punished with imprisonment           
from one to three years” and specified that if these acts are committed by means of mass media,                  
“editors-in-chief who have not participated in the perpetration of the crime shall be punished              
167 Yaman Akdeniz and Kerem Altıparmak, “Turkey: Freedom of Expression in Jeopardy: Violations of the Rights 
of Authors, Publishers and Academics under the State of Emergency,” Report for English PEN, March 2018, 3. 
https://www.englishpen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Turkey_Freedom_of_Expression_in_Jeopardy_ENG.pdf​ . 
168 ​Ibid​, 6.  
169 Turkey: Criminal Code [Turkey], Law No. 5237, 26 September 2004, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c447a5f2.html​, translation provided by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights. Art. 220 § 6 and 7.  Article 2 reads: “Any person, who, being a member of organisations formed 
to achieve to achieve the aims specified under Article 1, in concert with others or individually, commits a crime in 
furtherance of these aims, or who, even though does not commit the targeted crime, is a member of the 
organisations, is defined as a terrorist offender.” ​See​ Law on Fight Against Terrorism, Act. No. 3713, 1991, as 
amended: 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010. ​https://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/50/topic/5​.  
170 Ibid, ​Art. 220(6). 
171 "Turkey: Law No. 3713 of 1991, Law to Fight Terrorism." ​Refworld​. April 12, 1991, as amended: 1995, 1999, 
2003, 2006, 2010 ​http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c4477652.html​ Article 7(2).  
172 ​Ibid, ​Article 7.  
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with a judicial fine.” The same article criminalizes several broad forms of ‘announcement and              173
publication’ including the “publication of periodicals involving public incitement of crimes           
within the framework of activities of a terrorist organisation, praise of committed crimes or of               
criminals or the propaganda of a terrorist organisation.”  174
 
Human rights activists and civil society organizers are at particular risk of being prosecuted              
under Article 7(a) and (b) of the Anti-Terror Act. Article 7(a) limits the freedom of assembly by                 
prohibiting “covering the face in part or in whole, with the intention of concealing identities”               
during public meetings and demonstrations “that have been turned into a propaganda for a              
terrorist organisation.” Article 7(b) broadens the interpretation of ‘membership in a terrorist            175
organisation’ by criminalizing the carrying of insignia and signs belonging to the organisation,             
shouting slogans or making announcements that “imply being a member or follower of a terrorist               
organisation.” The crackdown on freedoms of speech, expression, and association levied by            176
emergency decrees has targeted certain groups unrelated to the failed coup, namely media and              
journalism, academia and education, legal and judicial bodies, human rights groups and other             
civil society organizations.  
 
B.  Impacts of Emergency Decrees on Freedoms of Expression, 
Association, and Assembly 
 
In its first emergency decree of July 23, 2016, the Turkish government ordered the permanent               
dissolution of any institution, structure, entity, organization, or group “found to pose a threat to               
national security, or whose connection or contact with them have been found to exist.” The               177
decree resulted in the immediate closure of 934 private schools, 15 universities, and 1,229 civil               
society associations and foundations. Decree No. 668, passed two days later, turned its attention              
from civil society and the education sector to the media, ordering the immediate closure of 45                
newspapers, 18 television networks, 23 radio stations and three news agencies based on their              
perceived support of or connection to FETÖ. In late October of the same year, Decree No. 675                 
ordered the closure of another 16 newspapers, 2 news agencies, 3 journals, 1 television network,               
and 1 radio station while the following month, Decree No. 677 shuttered 357 more associations,               
7 newspapers, 1 journal and 1 radio station. Through Decree Nos. 668, 675, 677 and 683, the                 178
173 ​Ibid, ​Article 6;  judicial fine from one thousand to fifteen thousand days’ rates. However, the upper limit of this 
sentence for editors-in-chief is five thousand days’ rates.  
174 ​Ibid, ​Article 6. 
175 ​Ibid, ​Article 7(a). 
176 ​Ibid, ​Article 7(b).  
177 Decree No. 667, passed July 22, 2016, available in English at: 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168069661d  
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Turkish government liquidated 166 media outlets, including publishing houses, newspapers and           
magazines, news agencies, TV stations and radios, on the grounds that they “belong to, connect               
to, or have contact with” FETÖ.   179
 
Civil society and the media have been particularly vulnerable to terror-related arrests and             
prosecutions during the SoE crackdown. 370 human right NGOs were suspended within four             
months of the failed coup. Turkey, which already accounted for one-third of the world’s jailed               180
journalists prior to the coup, imprisoned 149 journalists within six months of it, most of whom                
were kept in pretrial detention without access to legal counsel for several months. Altogether,              181
more than 300 journalists and editors have been arrested and charged with a range of               
terror-related offences stemming from the government’s allegation that their publications          
contained “apologist sentiments” regarding terrorism or other verbal act offences. Prosecutions           
of journalists have primarily been based on charges of disseminating propaganda on behalf of a               
terrorist organization, being a member of or working in the press office of an armed terrorist                
organisation. Those media outlets and journalists that have avoided closure or arrest have             182
faced a reported “increase in pressure and intimidation” from government officials. In a public              183
memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in Turkey, released in February             
2017, the Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe, Nils Muižnieks, noted that               
the SoE had led to a further increase in an already high level of intolerance towards “legitimate                 
criticism of elected officials and their policies”, which manifested in “aggressive civil lawsuits,             
exclusions of critical journalists from government events, as well as numerous reported cases of              
direct or indirect pressure on media companies to change their editorial policy or fire              
journalists.”  184
 
Emergency decrees also provided the basis for a series of mass dismissals and arrests that have                
heavily impacted lawyers, judges, and prosecutors. Legal and judicial bodies were immediately            
targeted by emergency decrees, as first made clear when more than 3,000 judges and prosecutors               
179 Decree No. 668, Art. 2, passed July 27, 2016, available in English at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e  
180 Ece Toksabay and Can Sezer, “Turkey continues to clamp down on human rights and children’s organizations 
following July’s attempted coup,” ​Business Insider, ​November 12, 2016, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/r-turkey-halts-activities-of-370-groups-as-purge-widens-2016-11​.  





184 “Memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in Turkey,” Commissioner for Human Rights: 
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were arrested within twenty-four hours of the coup. In fact, EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn              185
suggested to the ​Irish Times that such immediate identification and detention likely meant that              
members of the judiciary were targeted based on a “list… prepared in advance to be used at a                  
certain stage.” According to Human Rights Watch, one month after the coup the authorities              186
had yet to present any evidence to substantiate the allegations of criminal conduct against the               
1,684 judges and prosecutors being held in pretrial detention. The ensuing arrests of 2,204              187
judges in the criminal judiciary and 541 in the administrative judiciary amounted to the              
suspension of 36% of all judges in Turkey at the time , creating a domino effect for the overall                  188
state of justice and the rule of law in the country. 
 
Academic freedom has also been impacted by the slew of emergency decrees, with 28,163              
people from the Ministry of Education and 236 academics from public universities dismissed by              
Decree No. 672, passed on September 1, 2016, and 2,219 from the Ministry of Education and                
1,267 academics dismissed by Decree No. 675 the following month. In November, Decree No.              189
677 dismissed another 942 academics and 119 employees of the Ministry of Education, publicly              
listing names of those targeted for terror-related dismissal in annexes attached to the emergency              
decrees and distributed in the government’s nationwide ​T.C.​ ​Gazette​.   190
 
By publicly naming-and-shaming academics with alleged links to the Gulen movement, the            
decrees have not only denigrated the presumption of innocence but further compromised            
academic freedom from within. The SoE saw a sudden uptick in cases of students reporting               
professors and tutors to the university or to law enforcement for criticizing the government. In               
fact, the MIT reported that the number of people offering tips almost doubled from 34,000 in                
2015 to 65,000 in 2016. In several cases, students clandestinely recorded fellow students and              191
professors criticizing the government, which has created an atmosphere of fear and paranoia.             
Self-censorship has festered in the place of academic freedom, with one dismissed political             
185 ​Ruadhan Mac Cormaic, “Why has Turkey locked up 3,000 judges?” ​The Irish Times,​ July 19, 2016, 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/why-has-turkey-locked-up-3-000-judges-1.2726431​.  
186 ​Ibid. ​ Decree No. 675 dismissed another 2,536 people from the Ministry of Justice and 182 people from the 
Presidency of the Judicial Council. Decree No. 677 resulted in the dismissal of 15 people from the High Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors, while Decree No. 679 ordered the dismissal of 699 employees of the Ministry of Justice and 
eight members of the Presidency of the Judicial Council. 
187 “Turkey: Judges, Prosecutors Unfairly Jailed,” ​Human Rights Watch, ​August 5, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/05/turkey-judges-prosecutors-unfairly-jailed​.  
188 “Human Rights Now urges the government of Turkey to respect international human rights laws and give all 
detained and suspended lawyers, judges and prosecutors the full right to exercise their duties,” press release issued 
by Human Rights Now, August 15, 2016, ​http://hrn.or.jp/eng/news/2016/08/15/turkey-detained-lawyers-statement/​.  
189 Decree No. 675, passed October 29, 2016, available online in English at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e​.  
190 Decree No. 677, passed November 22, 2016, available online in English at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e​.  
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scientist stating that “Nobody can speak out freely and without fear anymore” due to the stifling                
and policing of critical speech. President Erdogan has encouraged the public to act as              192
informants, telling the public in October 2016: “You may have friends from that community. I               
say: denounce them. You must inform our prosecutors. This is the duty of a patriot.”   193
 
Rhetoric of this kind has been a key element of Turkey’s post-coup counterterrorism strategy.              
The AKP has conflated the concept of a ‘terrorist’ with that of a traitor, painting criticism of                 
government policy as a betrayal of the country. Such a conflation has further been used to cast                 
the international community as acting against the interests of the Turkish state, diminishing the              
leverage of international human rights bodies and mechanisms. For example, when a petition             
circulated calling for international experts to monitor the Turkish military offensive in Afrin,             
Erdogan stated: “...they also invite foreigners to monitor developments. This is the mentality of              
colonialism.” The president further accused the petition signatories of being a “fifth column”             194
and of “disseminating a colonisers’ mentality.” Human rights defenders similarly calling for            195
international bodies like the UN and the EU to restrain Erdogan’s post-coup crackdown have              
been smeared by the government as “agents of foreign forces” and “terrorists lovers or              
supporters.”   196
 
Consequently, Turkish human rights defenders, journalists, and academics with strong ties to the             
international community have faced charges of ‘espionage’ under Article 337 of the TCK in              
addition to the common terror-related offences discussed above. Journalists Can Dundar and            
Erdem Gul, for example, were charged with espionage, as was Deniz Yucel, Turkey             
correspondent for the German newspaper ​Die Welt. During the one-year period that Yücel was              
under arrest without any charges brought against him, President Erdogan repeatedly declared that             
Yücel was a “German spy and a terrorist.” Erdogan has levelled the same accusations against               197
several foreign national and dual citizen journalists, academics, and human rights defenders            
caught up in the post-coup purge.  
 
192 “Turkey: Government Targeting Academics,” Human Rights Watch, May 14, 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/turkey-government-targeting-academics​.  
193 “Erdogan’s informers: Turkey’s descent into fear and betrayal,” ​Financial Times​, March 15, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/6af8aaea-0906-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b​.  
194 “Turkey slams academics over petition, invites Chomsky to Turkey,” ​Hurriyet Daily News,​ January 12, 2016, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-slams-academics-over-petition-invites-chomsky-to-turkey-93760​.  
195 Matthew Weaver, “Turkey rounds up academics who signed petition denouncing attacks on Kurds,” ​The 
Guardian, ​January 15, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/turkey-rounds-up-academics-who-signed-petition-denouncing-atta
cks-on-kurds​.  
196 Hannah Lucinda Smith, “Human Rights Workers Are Western Spies, Erdogan Claims,” ​The Times​, 26 July 2017, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/erdogan-brandsdetained-human-rights-workers-western-spies-mzft582f8​.  
197 “German reporter Deniz Yucel, in prison interview, says Erdogan is ‘afraid’,” ​Deutsche Welle, ​November 11, 
2017, ​dw.com/en/german-reporter-deniz-y%C3%BCcel-in-prison-interview-says-erdogan-is-afraid/a-41336294  
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Finally, Turkey has brandished terrorism rhetoric to justify a crackdown on freedom of assembly              
in the aftermath of the attempted coup. The government initially restricted freedom of assembly              
on the grounds of ‘national security’ during the Gezi Park protests of 2013, during which it                
responded to peaceful demonstrations against the AKP by explicitly threatening to treat            
protesters like ‘terrorists’. In an interview two days into the Gezi Park protests, then-minister of               
European Union Affairs, Egemen Bağış, told broadcaster ​A Haber​: “From this point on, anybody              
who remains there will be treated as terrorists.” Erdogan has used much the same rhetoric               198
throughout the recent SoE period: for example, in response to students at Istanbul’s Boğaziçi              
University gathering to peacefully protest Turkey’s military excursion into Afrin, Syria, Erdoğan            
himself publicly declared them “traitors to their country” and accused them of being “terrorist              
youth.” In a worrying indication of the president’s power, twenty-four students were            199
immediately detained, and fourteen were subsequently charged with ‘spreading propaganda for a            
terrorist organization’ as a result of criticizing Turkish government policy.   200
 
The trend of retribution via arrest, detention, dismissal and and liquidation has continued             
throughout the two-year emergency period, demonstrating a range of worrying elements           
including direct executive interference, heavily politicized prosecutions, and a blurring between           
‘terrorism’, dissent, and civil disobedience. Erdogan has exploited the SoE to purge all political              
opposition and muzzle dissent in civil society. As one Canadian journalist noted, “The purges              
came so swiftly that it became apparent Mr. Erdogan must have had lists prepared beforehand.               
He himself called the failed putsch a ‘gift from god as he settled scores and eliminated political                 
opponents, including prosecutors who were bringing corruption charges against him.”   201
 
The widespread and longterm crackdown has produced a complex web of severe human rights              
violations on a massive scale. Though this research focuses primarily on civil and political rights,               
the social and economic rights violated by the emergency measures on an individual scale should               
not be discounted. For example, several academics who have lost their jobs have committed              
suicide, while others have reported financial difficulty or social stigma affecting job prospects,             
physical health, and mental wellbeing. Thousands of others allegedly involved in the coup had              
their passports revoked and citizenships stripped, which human rights groups have warned            
violates international laws prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of nationality and creates an issue             
198 “Police to consider protesters in Istanbul’s Taksim Square terror organization members: Minister,” ​Hurriyet Daily 
News​, June 16, 2013, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-to-consider-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim-square-terror-organization-me
mbers-minister-48875​.  
199 “Turkey: Government Targeting Academics,” Human Rights Watch, May 14, 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/turkey-government-targeting-academics​.  
200 Ibid. 
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of statelessness. Ultimately, it is clear that the unchecked and expansive emergency decrees             202
deeming dissenting opinions and associations criminal offences under Turkey’s Anti-Terror Act           
are directly responsible for a myriad of severe human rights violations.   203
 
C.  Surveillance, Social Media, and the Right to Privacy 
 
Increased government control of commonly used information and communication technologies          
(ICTs) has further facilitated Turkey’s crackdown on freedoms of expression and association by             
violating rights to privacy. The right to privacy is set out in Article 22 of the Turkish                 
constitution, which reads, “Everyone has the right to freedom of communication, and secrecy of              
communication is fundamental.” Under the relevant international legal framework, it is set out             
by Articles 8 and 9 of the ECHR, with Article 8(1) declaring that “Everyone has the right to                  
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” and 8(2) further stating                
that “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right.”                204
Similarly, Article 17(1) of the ICCPR states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or                
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.” Both Article 9(1) of             205
the ECHR and Article 18(1) of the ICCPR further state that: “Everyone has the right to freedom                 
of thought, conscience and religion...either alone or in community with others and in public or               
private…”   206
 
However, it should be noted that under both domestic and international law, the government may               
violate the right to privacy if necessary for reasons of ‘national security.’ Article 22 of the                
Turkish constitution permits violation under a court order in cases of “national security, public              
order, prevention of the commission of crimes…” Article 8(2) of the ECHR likewise provides              207
an exception on the basis of national security: “in the interests of national security, public               
safety...for the prevention of disorder or crime…” Derogating from the right to privacy on the               208
grounds of national security is permissible, then, even beyond the parameters of a declared              
emergency, but the extent to which Turkey has impeded on this right and the permanent basis on                 
which it has done so raises questions as to whether its measures meet the threshold of the                 
‘national security’ exception.  
202 Emma Batha,“Turkey's threat over failed coup risks leaving scores stateless: think tank,” ​Reuters​, July 17, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-stateless/turkeys-threat-over-failed-coup-risks-leaving-scores-stat
eless-think-tank-idUSKBN1A21B7​.  
203 “Turkey: Government Targeting Academics,” Human Rights Watch, May 14, 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/turkey-government-targeting-academics​.  
204 ​ECHR, Article 8(1) and (2). 
205 ​ICCPR, Article 17(1).  
206 ​ECHR, Article 9(1) and ICCPR, Article 18(1) 
207 Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html​.  
208 ​ECHR, Article 8(2). 
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The right to privacy was infringed most noticeably by the Turkish government’s co-option of              
social media monitoring as a counterterrorism tool. Three days after the attempted coup, the              
Turkish National Police issued a statement urging citizens to report law enforcement of social              
media users connected to the coup, while several emergency decrees issued in the ensuing              
months significantly widened Turkish surveillance powers and increased the capacity of law            
enforcement to access ICT-related records and data. Decree No. 670 empowered the            209
government to intercept all digital communications of people under coup-related investigation,           
as well as their spouses and children, and allowed the government to collect their personal data                
from private companies as well as public authorities. Decree No. 671 further empowered the              
Turkish authorities to “obtain and use information, documentation, data, and records from the             
relevant authorities within the scope of its tasks” while Decree No. 674 established a new               
‘Computer Forensics Specialization Department’ tasked with providing a “prompt, impartial and           
transparent system for experts on the matters requiring specializing in information technologies            
during judicial investigation.” Together these changes increased the capacity of the           210
government to successfully gather and weaponize personal data against dissenters.  
 
The government’s internet surveillance and censorship capabilities were particularly         
strengthened by Decree No. 671, passed on August 15, 2016, again on the pretext of maintaining                
“national security and public order.” The government alleged in this decree that the Turkish              211
Telecommunications Authority (TIB), a privately-held digital communications company, had         
been involved in the coup attempt and therefore ordered that it be brought under the control of                 
the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (​Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim          
Kurumu, ​BTK), a government agency responsible for regulating the telecommunications          
industry. As a result, the government gained the power to demand that internet service providers               
(ISPs) remove content and block websites at its behest. The BTK is legally obliged to comply                212
209 Bilge Yesil and Efe Kerem Sozeri, “Online Surveillance in Turkey: Legislation, Technology and Citizen 
Involvement,” ​Surveillance & Society​ 15, no. 3, (2017): 546, 
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index​. 
210  Decree No. 671, passed on August 17, 2016, “Turkey: Extracts - Emergency Decree Laws Nos. KHK/668, 670, 
671, 675, 677, 679, 680, 683, 685, 686, 687,” European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission). Strasbourg, 20 February 2017. Opinion No. 872/2016. CDL-REF(2017)011. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e​. Decree 674, passed on 
September 1, 2016. “Turkey: Emergency Decree Laws of July - September 2016, Nos. 667 - 674.  European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Strasbourg, November 10, 2016. Opinion No. 
865/2016. CDL-REF(2016)061. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)061-e​.  
211 Decree No. 671, “Turkey: Extracts - Emergency Decree Laws Nos. KHK/668, 670, 671, 675, 677, 679, 680, 683, 
685, 686, 687.” European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Strasbourg, 20 
February 2017. Opinion No. 872/2016. CDL-REF(2017)011. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e​.  
212 “Turkey - 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor. April 20, 2018, ​https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2017/eur/277227.htm​.   
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with the government’s request to block websites within four hours, and is not required to inform                
the public of the reasons for the block. Government ministers, including the president, have the               
power to order websites blocked; President Erdogan reportedly employed staff to constantly            
monitor the internet and brought charges against individuals found to be insulting the             
government online. Charges based on opinions posted online were facilitated by Decree No.             213
680, which amended the Law on Police Duties and Responsibilities to grant police the authority               
to access information on the identity of internet users for purposes of investigating crimes              
committed online.  214
 
The government has made full use of its newfound powers to repress freedom of speech and                
expression online. According to the internet freedom NGO ​Engelliweb​, the number of websites             
blocked annually in Turkey shot from 58,635 in 2014 to 115,315 in 2016, with the vast majority                 
(93%) ordered blocked by the government through the BTK as opposed to ordered blocked by a                
judicial court order. The internal transparency report of global social media platform Twitter is              215
also revealing: according to its data, Turkish authorities made 2,493 legal requests to remove              
content from Twitter, and ordered Twitter to block more than 30 media and journalism-related              
accounts between July and September 2016 alone. In fact, Twitter has reported that Turkey              216
requests the blocking or removal of content more than any other government. 
 
While the emergency decrees and the measures they authorized were made public, there is              
evidence to suggest that the Turkish government also began monitoring people secretly during             
the SoE. According to the Citizen Lab, an academic research laboratory that investigates digital              
espionage against civil society and other practices impacting freedom of expression online, the             
Turkish government may have begun using digital spyware programs to surveil the public.             217
Secret surveillance programs have likely been used to collect information on users’ online             
behavior without their knowledge, enable the interception of passwords and emails, and perhaps             
most troublingly, enable the remote control of a device’s microphone to record conversations.   218
213 ​Ibid​. 
214 Decree No. 680, “Turkey: Extracts - Emergency Decree Laws Nos. KHK/668, 670, 671, 675, 677, 679, 680, 683, 
685, 686, 687,” European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Strasbourg, 20 
February 2017. Opinion No. 872/2016. CDL-REF(2017)011. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e​.  
215 Bilge Yesil and Efe Kerem Sozeri, “Turkey’s Internet Policy after the Coup Attempt: The Emergence of a 
Distributed Network of Online Suppression and Surveillance,” Internet Policy Observatory, February 28, 2017, 
available at: ​http://repository.upenn.edu/internetpolicyobservatory/22​.  
216 “Turkey leads in social media censorship: new Twitter transparency report,” ​Turkey Blocks​, March 21, 2017, 
https://turkeyblocks.org/2017/03/21/turkey-leads-social-media-censorship-new-twitter-transparency-report​.  
217 For more detailed information, ​see​ “Bad Traffic: Sandvine’s PacketLogic Devices Used to Deploy Government 
Spyware in Turkey and Redirect Egyptian Users to Affiliate Ads?” ​Citizen Lab, ​March 9, 2018, 
https://citizenlab.ca/2018/03/bad-traffic-sandvines-packetlogic-devices-deploy-government-spyware-turkey-syria/​.  
218 Programs include Phorm, Package Shaper, Remote Control Systems; FinFisher; and Procera Networks.  ​See​ Yesil 
and Sozeri, “Online Surveillance in Turkey,” 546. 
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Government monitoring and surveillance has provided the basis for thousands of terror-related            
prosecutions. Within six months of the failed coup, the Turkish government had detained and              
investigated 3,861 people due to “social media sharing”, 1,734 of whom were subsequently             
arrested on terror-related charges. Charges related to social media have predominantly been            219
“inciting public enmity and hatred”, “propagating on behalf of terrorist organizations”,           
“announcing one’s affiliation with terrorist organizations”, “engaging in defamatory or libelous           
remarks against state officials”, and “threatening state sovereignty and public safety.” According            
to international NGO Freedom House, more than 70,000 social media accounts have been put              
under surveillance since July 2016. The surveillance ‘terror probe’ has resulted in the opening              220
of at least 10,000 criminal investigations into ‘terror-related activity’ on social media and the              
Internet as a whole, despite the fact that no laws in Turkey specifically criminalize the online                
activities in question.  221
 
D.  Countering Terror or Criminalizing Dissent? Case Studies  
 
Is the Turkish government fighting terrorism, or is it using its newfound emergency powers to               
stifle dissent? A closer analysis of individual cases suggests that many such terror-related             
dismissals, arrests and prosecutions share no clear or substantial connection to the attempted             
coup and the group allegedly responsible for it. What many affected individuals do share,              
however, are critical stances on a range of government policies.  
 
Taner Kılıç, for example, has long been a vocal critic of Turkey’s human rights record. Kılıç is a                  
prominent Turkish civil rights activist, known internationally for founding the Turkey branch of             
Amnesty International and serving as its president since 2014. In both this position and his               222
previous position as chair of refugee rights NGO ​Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği​, which he             
held from 2008 to 2014, he publicly criticized the current AKP government and participated in               
various human rights oriented actions including online petitions and protests. In June 2017 he              
was arrested on charges of membership in a terrorist group and aiding a terrorist organization;               
the only claim against him was the alleged downloading of ByLock, which the prosecution failed               
to provide evidence for. ByLock is an encrypted communications application that the            
government claims was a key tool used by members of FETO to plan and execute the attempted                 
219 Özgun Topak, “The Making of a Totalitarian Surveillance Machine: Surveillance in Turkey Under AKP Rule,” 
Surveillance & Society​ 15, no. 3 (2017): 536, ​http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index​. 
220 Turkey: Country Profile, Freedom on the Net 2017, Freedom House, 2017, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/turkey​.  
221 “Turkey targets 10,000 social media users in ‘terror’ probe,” ​BBC, ​December 24, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38427933​.  
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overthrow. Though it was an easily accessible and popular app in 41 countries, available for free                
on Apple and Google app stores, and was fully legal prior to the coup, downloading ByLock has                 
been the central evidence used to arrest ‘tens of thousands’ of Turkish citizens, including 404               
people in October 2016 alone. Though Kılıç denied having downloaded the app, and several              223
independent experts could find no trace of it ever having been downloaded to his phone, he was                 
kept in pre-trial detention for more than one year. He was finally released in August 2018, but                 224
charges against him have not been dropped. 
 
Critical voices in journalism and media have similarly been targeted by terrorism charges.             
Thirteen reporters, editors, and executives from ​Cumhuriyet​, an opposition newspaper, were           
convicted of “aiding and abetting terror organizations without being a member” in April 2018 on               
the basis of sympathetic coverage towards FETO, the PKK, and DHKP-C, a far-left             
Marxist-Leninist group. The paper had reportedly been “fiercely critical” of Erdogan, “long            225
seen as a thorn in Erdogan’s side” and “one of the few remaining voices critical of the                 
government.” Most recently, expansive laws passed in relation to the Gulen movement’s            226
alleged coup have extended to people critical of the Turkish government’s military actions in              
Afrin, a Kurdish-majority town in Syria. According to the Turkish Interior Ministry, authorities             
detained 648 people between January 20 and February 26, 2018 over social media posts critical               
of the Afrin military operations. Most have been journalists, human rights activists, politicians,             227
members of NGOs, academics, and students. Journalist and human rights activist Nurcan            228
Baysal, for example, was charged with “inciting hatred and enmity among the population” for              
criticizing the Turkish military operation in Afrin on Twitter. She faces three years in jail as a                 
result of her posts, though according to HRW none of the eight tweets listed in the indictment                 
promote or incite any violence. Similarly, documentary filmmaker Sibel Tekin was detained            229
and released under judicial supervision for a handful of Twitter posts reporting on police              
repression of peaceful protests against the Afrin offensive.   230
 
223 “In Turkey, you can be arrested for having this app on your phone,” ​LA Times​, October 19, 2016, 
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-turkey-purge-crackdown-snap-story.html​.  
224 ​ Carlotta Gall, “Amnesty International Official in Turkey Ordered Released but Remains in Jail,” ​New York 
Times, ​January 31, 2018,  ​https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/world/europe/turkey-amnesty-international.html​.  
225 “Turkey: anti-Erdoğan journalists defiant after convictions on terror charges,” ​The Guardian, ​April 26, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/26/turkey-anti-erdogan-journalists-defiant-convictions-terror-charges​.  
226 Ali Kucukgocmen, “Turkish court sentences more than dozen Cumhuriyet staff to prison on terrorism charges,” 
Reuters​, April 25, 2018, 
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Among the most striking examples of the crackdown on dissent was the government’s response              
to the “Academics for Peace” petition. Signed by more than 2,000 people, the petition criticized               
the government’s military campaign in Kurdish towns in the southeast, objected to the heavy toll               
on Kurdish civilians, demanded an end to the round-the-clock curfews imposed on Kurdish             
areas, and called on the government to negotiate peace with the PKK. The government              231
responded by accusing petition signatories of making propaganda for a terrorist organisation. 500             
academics that signed the petition were fired, had their passports revoked, and were subject to               
travel bans. 148 of them were put on trial, facing sentences of up to seven and a half years in                    
prison. Such examples are not the exception but the norm, highlighting how the government              232
has widened the use of its draconian anti-terror laws far beyond coup-related activity and              
targeted a broad range of government critics in journalism, academia, and civil society.  
 
Turkey’s crackdown on the Kurds is arguably the clearest evidence that the government has              
exploited the SoE to purge opposition movements and silence dissent unrelated to the coup. The               
Kurds, an ethnic minority comprising approximately 20% of Turkey’s population, have no            
known organized links to the attempted overthrow. The Kurdish independence movement is            
entirely distinct from and in fact generally opposes the Gulenist movement, particularly given             
that Gulen has urged increased Turkish aggression against Kurdish separatism. Moreover, the            233
pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) publicly condemned the attempted coup. Yet it is             
Kurdish political parties and Kurdish media that have increasingly borne the brunt of the              
emergency counterterrorism campaign: eleven democratically-elected Kurdish members of        
parliament were arrested, thirty Kurdish mayors have been removed from office, more than             
11,000 teachers in Kurdish regions have been suspended and dismissed, and at least 20 Kurdish               
media outlets have been permanently shut down for “spreading terrorist propaganda.” While a             234
fuller discussion of ethnicity and independence movements in the context of counterterrorism is             
beyond the scope of this paper, it is critical to highlight that ethnic minorities are exceptionally                
vulnerable to abuses of emergency powers, politically motivated targeting, and the stifling of             
free expression and association under the guise of counterterrorism. 
 
The aforementioned rights violations are the direct result of broad, vaguely-worded emergency            
decrees passed under the SoE without sufficient opportunity for legislative debate or judicial             
challenge. According to Human Rights Watch, the emergency decrees fail to provide any             
231 Judith Butler and Başak Ertür, “In Turkey, academics asking for peace are accused of terrorism,” ​The Guardian​, 
December 11, 2017, 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/11/erdogan-turkey-academics-terrorism-violence-kurdish-people​.  
232 ​Ibid​. 
233 Diego Cupolo, “Voices of Turkey’s Purged,” ​The Atlantic, ​August 19, 2016, 
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individualized justifications or sufficient evidence of wrongdoing aside from the generic phrase            
of alleged ‘links to terrorist organizations’. The OHCHR found that the “sheer number,             235
frequency and lack of connection” of several decrees to the attempted coup indicates the misuse               
of emergency powers “to stifle any form of criticism or dissent vis-a-vis the government.”              236
While curtailed freedoms of speech and expression are nothing new in Turkey, previously             
sporadic violations have been replaced with what Baser (2017) describes as a troubling new era:               
“The government’s approach to using counterterrorism discourse as a weapon against dissent            
[has] promised suppression of freedom on an unprecedented scale.” The effects of such             237
emergency measures have breached Turkey’s obligations under both domestic and international           
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CHAPTER IV:  
Human Rights and Cross-Border Counterterrorism 
 
A. The Turkish Dragnet: Extraditions and State-Sponsored Abductions 
 
Under the SoE, Turkey has weaponized international policing systems and bilateral extradition            
treaties to hunt dissidents abroad. The cross-border counterterrorism operations are a direct result             
of the SoE: under Decree No. 3310, passed during a previous state of emergency in September                
1988, the government is empowered to plan and execute operations “beyond the borders of              
Turkey” to “capture or incapacitate persons who, having carried out [disruptive] actions in             
Turkey, have sought refuge in a neighboring country.” The government is only able to invoke               239
this power when an emergency per Article 121 of the Turkish constitution has been declared. 
 
Following the attempted coup, the government did not make any formal announcement signaling             
its intention to invoke this power. However, in a televised interview with ​Haberturk TV in early                
April 2018, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ said that MIT had extended its             
counterterrorism operations beyond Turkey’s borders, stating that Turkish intelligence agents          
had “bundled up and brought back 80 FETO members from 18 countries.” Three months later,               240
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu publicly acknowledged in an interview with ​CNN            
Turk ​that the number of renditions had risen to more than one hundred: “We have been watching                 
these traitors for two years and have brought the leading figures of FETO to our country. I could                  
frankly say that more than 100 FETO affiliates have been brought to Turkey.” Turkish              241
nationals with alleged links to the attempted coup have been covertly seized from countries              
including Kosovo, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan, Myanmar, and Georgia, with           
unconfirmed reports of the same occuring in Greece and Afghanistan. A number of those              
abducted for alleged “links to terrorism” have been teachers or doctors at one of Gulen’s 3,000                
schools and health facilities worldwide.  
 
239 Decree No. 3310, September 3, 1988. 
240 “Turkey: Deputy PM touts success of MIT’s Gulen dragnet,” ​Deutsche Welle, ​April 5, 2018, 
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Transnational kidnappings and forced disappearances perpetrated by governments are generally          
known as “state-sponsored disappearances” or “irregular rendition.” This practice constitutes a           242
“hybrid human rights violation” combining elements of arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance,           
forcible transfer, torture, denial of access to consular officials, and denial of impartial tribunals.             
 243
 
Only a handful of the government’s post-coup irregular renditions have been publicly reported.             
One of the most high profile cases was the nighttime abduction of six Turkish nationals, five                
teachers and one doctor, from Kosovo in March 2018, during which the six were reportedly               
forced onto a Turkish military jet in a covert joint operation between MIT and the Kosovo                
interior ministry. The following month, it was revealed that two Turkish teachers had been              244
abducted by MIT agents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in late 2016 and subjected to “beating,               
torture, death threats and staged executions” while subsequently held in pretrial detention in             
Ankara. The Stockholm Center for Freedom reported in October 2017 that a Turkish man              245
abducted from Pakistan was abducted along with his wife and two daughters, forced onto an               
unmarked plane, and subjected to severe beatings and abuse by Turkish police and intelligence              
officers. President Erdogan’s press secretary, İbrahim Kalın, has denied that the foreign            246
abductions were illegal, insisting that the operations had been executed within the legal             
framework of bilateral extradition treaties.   247
 
However, extradition requires the knowledge and cooperation of the sending state, but several             
countries denied having any knowledge of the abductions. The Kosovar PM, for example, fired              
the chief intelligence agents responsible for orchestrating the abductions. Notably, MIT’s attempt            
to covertly seize Turkish national Veysel Akcay in Mongolia was disrupted by significant public              
pressure and government condemnation of the attempted abduction. After human rights activists            
gathered at the Genghis Khan airport to protest the forcible transfer, the Mongolian government              
242 Not to be confused with ‘extraordinary rendition’, which involves a third-party state, or rendition, which is the 
handing over or surrender of a fugitive from one state to another and includes extradition. The key difference in 
‘irregular rendition’ is that government-perpetrated abductions do not rely on the secondary state.  
243 David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, “Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis,” Harvard Journal of 
Human Rights 19 (2006): 127, 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=faculty_articles​. 
244 Kosovar PM subsequently stated that he was unaware of the operation and fired the intelligence agents 
responsible for it.  
245 “Cellmate: Teacher abducted by Turkey’s MİT from Malaysia subjected to torture in Ankara,” ​Stockholm Center 
for Freedom​, April 1, 2018, available at: 
https://stockholmcf.org/cellmate-teacher-abducted-by-turkeys-mit-from-malaysia-subjected-to-torture-in-ankara/​.  
246 “Turkish family faced abuse, violence and lies during forcible removal from Pakistan,” ​Stockholm Center for 
Freedom, ​October 31, 2017, 
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grounded the plane, removed the Turkish teacher, and announced its intention to investigate the              
attempted abduction, which the deputy Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh called “an           
unacceptable act of violation of Mongolia’s sovereignty and independence.”   248
 
Aside from this, most states have cooperated with Turkey’s more legal means of cross-border              
counterterrorism by extraditing nationals within their jurisdiction. During the SoE, Turkey has            
issued hundreds of extradition requests on the basis of alleged links to the coup; within three                
months of it, Turkey lodged 81 extradition requests to Germany alone. Countries that have              249
extradited Turkish nationals include Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Saudi           
Arabia, Gabon and Angola. In the context of international human rights law, extradition poses an               
interesting conundrum: while Turkey is acting within the law to request the extradition of its               
nationals from other states, the request transfers the onus to protect the human rights of Turkish                
nationals to the requested state.  
 
B.  The Principle of Non-Refoulement under International Human Rights Law 
 
Though no international law specific to extradition exists, bilateral extradition treaties and            
agreements are nonetheless restrained by the fundamental legal principle of ​non-refoulement​.           
First, under customary international law, a state does not have any obligation to surrender an               
alleged criminal to a foreign state, because a central principle of state sovereignty is the legal                
authority over any person within its borders. Second, under both customary international law             250
and the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”), states are              
prohibited from returning persons to a country “where their life or freedom would be threatened               
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political               
opinion” or where they are at risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or               
punishment.   251
 
248 Munkhchimeg Davaasharav, “Turkish teacher kidnapped in Mongolia freed after authorities ground flight,” 
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https://www.dw.com/en/germany-turkey-made-81-extradition-requests-since-failed-coup/a-41074177​.  
250 Dan E. Stigall, “Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial Enforcement 
Jurisdiction in International Law,” Notre Dame Journal of  International and Comparative Law 3, no. 1 (February 
2013): 19, ​https://ssrn.com/abstract=2211219​.  
251  The principle of non-refoulement is not limited to states that have signed and ratified the Refugee Convention, 
but has instead become a peremptory rule of customary international law based on consistent and widespread 
practice. Further, persons do not need to have formally sought asylum for the principle of non-refoulement to apply. 
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In the Turkish case, the risks of political persecution and subjection to torture bar the ​refoulement                
of Turkish nationals. First, with respect to political persecution, suspected Gulenists or other             
political dissidents face persecution based on their (perceived) membership to a social group             
and/or their political opinions, both of which are increasingly deemed ‘terrorism’ by the Turkish              
government. Further, political persecution automatically jeopardizes the right to a fair trial, a             
non-derogable right under international human rights law treaties, including the ECHR and the             
ICCPR, and customary international law. According to UNHCR, states considering extradition           
requests must assess the quality and impartiality of the criminal proceedings which would await              
him or her if surrendered. Customary international law recognized in the early 1800s that the               252
extradition of political dissidents would compromise the right to a fair trial, which led to the                
development of a ‘political offence exception’. This provision is highly relevant to Turkey’s             
current cross-border counterterrorism operations and the growing conflation between political          
dissidence and terrorism more broadly.  
 
The ‘political offence exception’, incorporated into the extradition treaties of several countries            
including France, Belgium, Britain and the United States, limits the obligation of a state to               
extradite a suspect if it believes they are being prosecuted for political reasons. Like              253
‘terrorism’, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of a ‘political offence’, but the             
exception generally applies to “offences directed against the political organization or government            
of a state, containing no element of a common crime whatsoever.” Pure political offenders act               254
as agents “for a group that wants to alter the political structure of the state”, aiming not to                  
commit violence against the civilian population but instead to disrupt or affect “the             
organizational structure of a state.” Pure political offences include treason, espionage, and            255
sedition. 
 
The classification of treason and sedition as purely political crimes poses a problem to President               
Erdogan, who has repeatedly accused Gulenist coup plotters of committing “an act of treason.”              256
Indeed, he seems to be correct on this point, as attempts to overthrow the government are a                 
252 Sibylle Kapferer, “The Interface between Extradition and Asylum,” UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy 
Research Series. PPLA/2003/05, November 2003. Available at:  ​http://www.unhcr.org/3fe84fad4.pdf​ p. ix.  
253 Aimee J. Buckland, “Offending Officials: Former Government Actors and the Political Offense Exception to 
Extradition,” ​California Law Review​ 94, no. 2 (March 2006): 440, 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol94/iss2/4​. 
254 Antje C. Petersen, “Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism,” ​Indiana 
Law Journal ​67, no. 3 (1992): 787, ​http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol67/iss3/6​.  
255 ​Ibid,​ 776.  
256 Kim Sengupta and Chris Stevenson, “Turkey coup: President Erdogan denounces ‘treason’ of attempt by military 
to take control of country,” ​The Independent, ​July 16, 2016, 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-erdogan-violence-military-government-a7140336.html​.   
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central tenet of the definition of treason in most individual jurisdictions. Given Erdogan’s own              257
admission that Gulenists are guilty of treason, then, it would seem that Turkish nationals with               
alleged links to the coup are not eligible for extradition. Further, the political crime of sedition,                
generally defined as “conduct or speech inciting people to rebel against the authority of a state or                 
monarch”, seems troublingly close to what Turkey prosecutes as ‘terrorist propaganda.’ It            258
becomes clear that the concerted conflation between political dissidence and terrorism serves a             
useful purpose: prosecutions on ‘terrorism’-related charges allow far more leeway in the context             
of extradition and international counterterrorism efforts than would more overt political charges,            
like treason and sedition. The political acts being prosecuted as ‘terrorism’-related offences casts             
doubt on the legality of extraditions and abductions of writers, journalists, academics, teachers,             
human rights activists and other political dissidents. 
 
Finally, the fundamental legal principle of ​non-refoulement prohibits states from returning           
persons to situations where they face serious risk of torture, summary execution, or other forms               
of cruel and degrading treatment or punishment. Codified in the UN Convention Against Torture              
(CAT), states are forbidden from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to another state              
where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected                
to torture. CAT further demands that the actual risk to a person be considered before transferring                
him or her to the custody of authorities in another country; a country’s anti-torture laws or verbal                 
assurances that a person will not be tortured are not sufficient guarantees for extradition. Risks of                
torture are heightened for persons irregularly rendered across borders without being granted an             
extradition or expulsion hearing before an independent judicial body. 
 
Torture and ill-treatment of detainees are prohibited under Turkish law: Article 15 of the              
Constitution declares that, even under circumstances of war, mobilization, or a state of             
emergency, the individual’s right to life and the integrity of his or her body and mind are                 
inviolable. Turkey is further bound by its 1988 ratification of CAT and the subsequent              259
Optional Protocol in 2011 (OPCAT). Allegations of torture in Turkish detention facilities have             260
nonetheless been widespread under the SoE. Human Rights Watch has documented ‘repeated            
and widespread’ instances of torture, including the beatings of detainees by security forces, the              
subjection of detainees to stress positions, and rape and sexual abuse, both threatened and              
257 Notably,  treason is not defined in the Turkish Constitution or the Turkish Criminal Code. For definitions of 
treason in other jurisdictions, ​see​ J. Taylor McConkie, “State Treason: The History and Validity of Treason Against 
Individual States,” ​Kentucky Law Journal ​101, no. 2 (2013): ​https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol101/iss2/3​.  




259 Turkish Criminal Code, Law No. 5237, September 26, 2004.  
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actualized. According to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,               261
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, detainees have consistently reported “severe           
beatings, punches and kicking, blows with objects, ​falaqa​, threats and verbal abuse, being forced              
to strip naked, rape with objects, other sexual violence or threats thereof, sleep deprivation, stress               
positions, and extended blindfolding and/or handcuffing for several days.”   262
 
The ​non-refoulement bar to extradition includes the risk of being subject to summary execution,              
an issue that has resurfaced in Turkey under the SoE. Though Turkey prohibited the death               
penalty in 2004, in the days immediately following the failed coup Erdogan vowed to “chop off                
traitors’ heads” in retaliation. Such rhetoric transformed to a call for action: in April 2017,               
Erdogan began serious discussions with the prime minister and prominent parliamentarians to            
reintroduce capital punishment and use it against coup conspirators. If the death penalty were              263
to be reintroduced, it would deepen states’ responsibility to refuse extradition requests and             
prevent state-sponsored abductions of Turkish nationals within their jurisdiction. 
 
Though bilateral extradition treaties often incorporate rights-based safeguards, and are          
theoretically subject to the aforementioned aspects of international customary law, extraditions           
are ultimately not governed by a legally-binding international convention. Critically, this renders            
extradition not a legal process but a political one: while judicial and legislative bodies in a                
requested state may object to an extradition on human rights-related grounds, they can generally              
be overruled by the executive. As a result, political relations and strategic goals often outweigh               
potential human rights concerns: issues of ​refoulement may be ignored due to fears of provoking               
retaliatory measures or jeopardizing important political or economic relations, particularly if the            
requested state is weaker than or dependent on the requested country. Denial of extradition on               
the basis of human rights remains an ‘exceptional’ measure often used only in high-profile cases,               
and has not yet become an established norm produced by an independent, objective legal              
process.   264
 
Turkey’s successful hunt for dissidents abroad illustrates why strengthening international human           
rights protections in the context of cross-border counterterrorism is crucial. ​Non-refoulement           
applies to any form of removal: therefore, states bear the responsibility not only to reject               
261 “Turkey: Renewed Torture in Police Custody, Abductions,” Human Rights Watch, October 12, 2017, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/12/turkey-renewed-torture-police-custody-abductions​.  
262 "Turkish and Kurdish Detainees Tortured, Raped – UN Rapporteur Says," ​Ahval​, January 23, 2018, 
https://ahvalnews.com/human-rights/turkish-and-kurdish-detainees-tortured-raped-un-rapporteur-says​. ​Falaqa ​is a 
method of corporal punishment consisting of whipping the soles of a person’s bare feet. 
263 “Turkey referendum: Could Erdogan resume executions?” ​Deutsche Welle, ​April 24, 2017, 
https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-referendum-could-erdogan-resume-executions/a-38571043​.  
264 ​ Mariana (Mitra) ​Radu and Cătălina Mititelu, “The Observance of Human Rights and Freedoms in the 
Extradition Proceedings at National and International Levels,” ​Journal of Danubian Studies and Research​ 3, no. 2 
(2013): 105, ​http://journals.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/research/article/view/2085/1860​. 
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extradition requests but to ensure that Turkish dissidents are protected from covert abductions.             
Given that the power to extend counterterrorism operations transnationally can only be invoked             








































CHAPTER V:  
The Turkish Case: Findings and Analysis 
 
From the outset, Turkey’s derogations from the ECHR and the ICCPR was met with trepidation               
from the international community. Within one month of the failed coup, the UN Human Rights               
Council voiced concern over Turkey’s invocation of the ICCPR derogation clause: “The            
invocation of Article 4 is lawful only if there is a threat to the life of the nation, a condition that                     
arguably is not met in this case.” Two years later, initial concerns over the SoE in Turkey seem                  265
to be validated: as the above section made clear, emergency decrees and the counterterrorism              
measures contained therein have significantly impacted a range of human rights in Turkey, with              
a particularly detrimental effect on freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Dissidents            
whose opinions and associations have been deemed criminal face a second set of troubling              
human rights violations related to abusive arrest and detention practices and heavily politicized             
terrorism prosecutions.  
 
However, under SoE derogation regimes, some leeway is afforded for such human rights             
violations. The critical question is therefore whether the emergency measures producing grave            
human rights abuses are legitimate per the derogation provisions of the ECHR and the ICCPR.               
Article 15 and Article 4 set out key criteria to determine whether emergency measures are valid,                
the interpretation of which has been developed by the ECtHR, the UN Human Rights              
Committee, the Siracusa Principles, and the Paris Minimum Standards. When invoking the right             
to derogate from human rights obligations, states have three duties: first, the derogating state              
must justify how the situation meets the threshold of a ‘public emergency’; second, it must               
sufficiently demonstrate how all derogation measures taken were proportionate to and strictly            
required by the situation; and third, it must under no circumstances violate non-derogable rights. 
 
A.  Public Emergencies, Proportionality, and Necessity 
 
In ​Lawless v. Ireland (1961) and the ​Greek Case (1969), the ECtHR set out four features that                 
determine whether a situation constitutes a ‘public emergency’: first, the emergency must be             
actual and imminent; second, its effects must involve the whole nation; third, the continuance of               
the organized life of the community must be threatened; and fourth, the crisis or danger must be                 
265 “UN experts urge Turkey to adhere to its human rights obligations even in time of declared emergency,” UN 
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exceptional to the point that normal measures are insufficient. It is questionable whether the              266
Turkish case possessed any of these four characteristics in the first place, let alone enough to                
warrant seven extensions of the SoE over a two-year period in total. It is also doubtful whether                 
the emergency measures taken fulfilled the elements of proportionality and necessity, which            
require the geographic and temporal scope of emergency measures to be strictly required and              
directly related to the cause of the SoE. 
 
First, it is questionable whether the situation in Turkey constituted an “actual and imminent”              
emergency given that the attempted coup had been quashed by the time the SoE was declared. In                 
fact, the Turkish government itself announced that the threat had been “crushed” and it had               
“regained full control” less than twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the coup. Moreover,              267
the government did not appear to fear any future “actual and imminent” threats of violence,               
occupation, terrorist attacks or armed struggles of any kind related to the initial coup attempt, as                
demonstrated by Prime Minister Binali Yildirim’s assurances to the public that “life had returned              
to normal” on July 17.  268
 
Second, it is difficult to argue that the effects of the attempted coup involved the whole nation or                  
threatened the organized life of the community. A successful coup may have met this threshold:               
a public subject to domination by an unelected military regime may sufficiently meet this              
criteria, even if individual members were not directly impacted by the overthrow itself. As the               
coup failed, however, this was not the case. In fact, the violence and public disorder emanating                
from the attempted coup was primarily limited to three major cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and              
Marmaris, in a country of 81 provinces and 923 districts. This further violates the element of                269
geographical coverage integral to the principle of proportionality: emergency decrees that impact            
the entire nation in response to a situation that only directly affected three cities for one night                 
certainly appears to contravene that requirement.  
 
Moreover, the very nature of a coup is that it is directed towards the government or ruling power.                  
As noted in an earlier section, the language included in Article 15 of the ECHR does not mention                  
that the life of a state, government, party, administration or regime must be under threat but                
rather the life of the ​nation​. As Schreurer opined in 1982, interpreting this clause to include a                 
threat to the existing power structure and the status of the ruling elites must be rejected, given                 
266 ​The Greek Case​ (3321-23/67; 3344/67) 5.11.1969, para 153.  
267 “Erdogan claims Turkey coup is crushed,” ​Financial Times​, July 16, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/1e11f52a-4ac9-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab​.  
268 “Turkish warplanes patrol skies as country remains on edge after failed coup,” ​CBC News, ​July 18, 2016, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/turkey-coup-police-purge-eu-reaction-death-penalty-1.3683360​.  
269 “Turkey Political Map,” ​Turkish Press ​, undated, ​http://www.turkishpress.com/maps/turkey-political-map/​.  
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that it would render nonviolent opposition or even the victory of an opposition party justifiable               
grounds for derogation.   270
 
Third, it is worth inquiring what about the situation was so exceptional that it rendered ordinary                
measures inadequate to maintaining public order. By all accounts, the situation was under             
government control within one day; no systematic, organized, coup-related violence ensued           
beyond that one-day period. Once violent activity was subdued, it is not clear why normal               271
investigative and judicial measures were insufficient to pursue and prosecute the coupists. Four             
days after the failed coup, the Secretariat of the NSC stated that it had recommended the                
implementation of an SoE to the government in order to “immediately eliminate all elements of               
the terrorist organization that committed the coup attempt.” However, this implies that the             272
objective of the SoE was punitive rather than preventative, used not to suppress ongoing acts of                
violence, but to punish the alleged perpetrators. In the absence of ongoing, widespread acts of               
violence threatening the functioning of the public order, health, or safety, there is no clear reason                
why fighting terrorism and eliminating elements of terrorist groups should not be carried out              
within the bounds of ordinary criminal law and counterterrorism policy.  
 
The length of the SoE and the scope of the emergency decrees passed further seem to violate                 
principles of proportionality and necessity. The requirement of proportionality dictates that the            
extent of a derogation must be “strictly related” to the situation: there must be a clear link                 
between the facts of the emergency and the specific measures chosen. Decrees and measures              273
implemented several months after the situation had been resolved maintain a tenuous link to the               
emergency at best. This can be gleaned from the language used in emergency decrees: while the                
first SoE decrees justify their measures as necessary to “fight against the coup attempt”,              
subsequent decrees widen their net by using vague, general language like “fighting against             
terrorism” and “fighting entities threatening national security.” The Siracusa Principles and the            
Paris Minimum Standards similarly set out that exceptional measures taken must be temporary,             
but Turkey has permanently incorporated several emergency elements into its national laws,            
which violates the principles of temporariness and necessity.  
270 Christoph Schreuer, “Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The Experience of the 
European Convention on Human Rights,” Yale Journal of International Law 9, no. 1 (1982): 122, 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol9/iss1/6​.  
271 There were reports of some groups taking advantage of the instability to perpetrate acts of violence. For instance, 
in Malatya groups of pro-AKP Sunni Muslims reportedly entered Paşaköşkü and Çavuşoğlu to threaten ethnic Alevi 
residents. However, there was no further organized violence attributed to the Peace at Home Council responsible for 
the attempted coup. 
272 “NSC Recommends Government to Declare State of Emergency,” press release from the Office of the Presidency 
of the Republic of Turkey, July 20, 2016. Available in English at: 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/49699/nsc-recommends-government-to-declare-state-of-emergency​.  
273 ​Report of the European Commission on Human Rights (Ireland v. U.K.), 1976-78 ECHR, ser. B, vol. 23-I, at 8 
Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2 ECHR 25 (Eur. Court of Human Rights) p. 119.  
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B.  Non-Derogable Rights: Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom from Torture 
 
Finally, mounting evidence suggests that Turkey has violated two fundamental rights deemed            
strictly non-derogable under the ECHR and the ICCPR: the right to be free from torture,               
including inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, and the right to fair trial and due               
process. First, under the SoE, there has been a sharp uptick in allegations of torture used against                 
individuals detained in connection to the failed coup. In fact, the majority of documented cases               
of torture and ill-treatment in custody have concerned individuals detained on terror-related            
charges under the Anti-Terror Law. In an April 2017 report, international NGO Freedom from              
Torture found that of sixty subjects alleging torture, thirty-six or 60% specified that it was               
anti-terrorist units of the police that detained and tortured them in custody. Another fifteen              274
people or 25% of the subjects surveyed said that they were detained and tortured by the                
Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism unit known in Turkish as ​Jitem​. The pattern of             275
torture used only against persons detained in connection to the coup suggests that it is being used                 
as a purposeful tool of repression and retaliation. According to Freedom from Torture, torture is               
not used sporadically but is instead a method of control Turkey “systematically uses to suppress               
and stamp out political dissent.”  276
 
The SoE has further facilitated the use of torture by authorizing the removal of several               
rights-based safeguards designed to strengthen protections for detainees. A report published by            
Human Rights Watch in October 2017, for example, cites the denial of sufficient access to legal                
aid and representation as preventing the timely reporting and documentation of torture. OHCHR             
similarly argued that unfettered access to a lawyer is a key condition to the prohibition of torture                 
and the right to liberty. Detention facilities have further refused to provide detainee’s medical              277
reports to their legal counsel, a practice that both OHCHR and HRW condemn as preventing the                
adequate documentation and substantiation of allegations of physical abuse.   278
 
Second, Turkey’s emergency measures have violated rights to liberty, due process, and fair trial.              
According to the UN Human Rights Committee, the jurisprudence of the supervisory and judicial              
274 “​Torture in Turkey: past, present, and future?” Report published by Freedom from Torture, April 2017, 
https://www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/news/country_briefing_final_0.pdf​ 7.  
275 ​Ibid,​ 7. 
276 ​Ibid, ​2.  
277  Preliminary observations and recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr. Nils Melzer;  Official visit to Turkey – 27 Nov. to 2 Dec. 2016: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20976&LangID=E#sthash.KzObbpgb.M
lBbmjRA.dpuf​.  
278 “Report on the impact of the state of emergency on human rights in Turkey, including an update on the 
South-East,  January – December 2017,” Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 2018, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/2018-03-19_Second_OHCHR_Turkey_Report.pdf​ 19.  
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organs of the ECHR and the ICCPR have extended non-derogability status to the “fundamental              
requirements of the rights to a fair trial and to liberty.” Elements of fair trial include the                 279
presumption of innocence, the right to a lawyer, and the right to challenge the lawfulness of                
detention before an independent judicial body, as guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. As             280
Kadelbach and Roth-Isigkeit (2017) argue, the procedural guarantees inherent to the right to fair              
trial underlie all other guarantees of the ECHR: in essence, independent judicial review             
mechanisms protect the ‘right to invoke rights’.  281
 
Several measures implemented by Turkey’s emergency decrees have severely jeopardized the           
right to fair trial. The first emergency decree limited detainees’ access to legal counsel,              
empowering the government to detain suspects without charge and hold them ​incommunicado            
for 30 days, a sharp increase from the previous limit of four days. Decree No. 668 allowed the                  282
government to deny detainees accused of crimes within the scope of the Anti-Terror Law access               
to a lawyer for up to five days, an increase from the previous limit of twenty-four hours, which                  
was later permanently incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Code by Decree No. 676. The              
government further compromised attorney-client privilege by granting itself the right to record,            
limit, end, or attend meetings per Article 6 of Decree No. 668: “Meetings between lawyers and                
clients may be recorded, observed, and/or interrupted by a public official where there is a threat                
to national security and the client has been convicted for a terror crime.” The scope of this                 283
power was later broadened to include the monitoring of all communications between attorneys             
and clients, in person or otherwise, therefore effectively suspending attorney-client privilege, a            
central element of fair trial guarantees. According to Human Rights Joint Platform, more than              284
600 lawyers have themselves been arrested on presumption of “guilt by association” with clients,              
which violates the right to defence, another key component of the right to a fair trial.   285
279 Human Rights Committee (CCPR), General Comment no. 29, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 
2001, para. 14-16. 
280 ​Joan Fitzpatrick, “Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights,” ​European Journal of 
International Law​ 14, no. 2 (April 2003): 248, ​https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/14.2.241​.  
281  Kadelbach and Roth-Isigkeit, “The Right to Invoke Rights,” 277.  
282 Moreover, there were reportedly numerous instances where persons were held without charge in excess of the 30 
day limit. ​See ​“Report on the impact of the state of emergency on human rights in Turkey, including an update on 
the South-East,  January – December 2017,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
March 2018, ​https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/2018-03-19_Second_OHCHR_Turkey_Report.pdf​.  
283 Decree No. 667, ​see ​“Turkey: Emergency Decree Laws of July - September 2016, Nos. 667 - 674.  European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Strasbourg, November 10, 2016. Opinion No. 
865/2016. CDL-REF(2016)061. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)061-e​.  
284 ​Decree No. 676, ​see ​“Turkey: Extracts - Emergency Decree Laws Nos. KHK/668, 670, 671, 675, 676,  677, 679, 
680, 683, 685, 686, 687.” European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Strasbourg, 
20 February 2017. Opinion No. 872/2016. CDL-REF(2017)011. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)011-e​ .  
285 “A state in emergency? When exceptions become the new norm,” report published by Civil Rights Defenders 
(Stockholm: March 2018) 9,  ​https://crd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CRD-6700-Rapport-Turkiet-1.pdf​.  
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Moreover, the right to liberty includes the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the                 
arrest. Turkey has violated this right by refusing to provide individual bases for arrests and               286
further failing to provide evidence to that effect. The government provided a blanket reason for               
arrest to all persons charged in the wake of the coup - ‘links to a terrorist organisation’ - but it is                     
questionable whether this satisfies the right to liberty. Turkey has not made public what methods               
were used to determine dismissals and arrests, nor what proof of wrongdoing has justified              
publicly accusing people of links to terrorism in the annexes of emergency decrees and lawyers               
have reported that they have no access to the evidence cited against their clients, due to national                 
security-related cases being subject to ‘confidentiality orders.’ According to OHCHR, many           287
individuals arrested in relation to emergency decrees “were not provided with evidence against             
them” and were unaware of the basis on which arrests were made, which the Commissioner for                















286 Guide on Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to liberty and security. Last updated on 
August 31, 2018. Published by the Council of Europe. Available at: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_5_ENG.pdf​.  
287 “Turkey: Government Targeting Academics,” Human Rights Watch, May 14, 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/turkey-government-targeting-academics​.  
288 Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights, Memorandum on the human rights implications of the 
measures taken under the state of emergency in Turkey, 7 October 2016, CommDH(2016)35, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/58120efb4.html​  ​See​ paras 23-24, 26, and 65. 
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CHAPTER VI:  
States of Emergency and International Law: 





Given the nature and scope of human rights abuses facilitated by the SoE in Turkey, a critical                 
question arises: how can international law better protect human rights during emergency            
situations? This section will first examine the monitoring and evaluation provisions of the ECHR              
and ICCPR derogation clauses, and then consider several political and economic dynamics that             
damage the efficacy of international human rights law in the case of Turkey and elsewhere. 
 
Both the ECHR and the ICCPR include monitoring and evaluation provisions. ​Article 19 of the               
ECHR established the ECtHR “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the              
High Contracting Parties” , while Article 46(2) assigned the Committee of Ministers of the             289
Council of Europe the responsibility to supervise the execution of ECtHR judgements and ensure              
that payments are awarded to successful applicants. Implementation of obligations under the            290
ICCPR are monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee, comprised of eighteen independent             
experts elected by states parties to serve four-year terms. Unlike the ECHR, the ICCPR did not                291
establish a judicial organ to enforce its judgments and therefore lacks the ability to legally               
compel changes in state behavior. Theoretically, then, the ECtHR has the strongest potential             
capacity to temper abusive counterterrorism campaigns and mitigate human rights violations           
during SoEs. The ability of the ECtHR to constrain human rights violations during emergencies              
will therefore be reviewed below.  
 
A. Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Since its establishment in 1959, the ECtHR has not shied away from cases involving human               
rights in Turkey. In fact, of 20,657 judgments issued between 1959 and 2017, Turkey was the                
289 ECHR, Article 19. 
290 “Derogation in time of emergency - factsheet.” ​European Court of Human Rights - Press Unit. ​August 2018. 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Derogation_ENG.pdf​, 2.  
291 “Human Rights Committee” homepage on the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights website, 
available at:  ​https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/ccpr/pages/ccprindex.aspx​.  
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respondent State in 3,386 (16.36%) of them. The ECtHR found that Turkey had violated              292
human rights in 2,988 of those judgments, or 88.2%, making it the foremost violator of human                
rights among ECHR member states. Most importantly for our purposes here is Turkey’s history              
of violating Article 10, which protects freedom of expression: of 700 judgments in which the               
ECtHR has found a violation of freedom of expression, Turkey ranks first with 281 judgments,               
far ahead of Russia with 39, France with 37, and Austria with 35. Further, according to                293
Akdeniz and Altiparmak in a March 2018 report for global press freedom NGO English PEN,               
most of the ECtHR’s judgments concerning Turkey are a result of politicized prosecutions under              
the Anti-Terror Law.  
 
The ECtHR has previously ruled on a number of the terror-related offences Turkey is currently               
using to target dissident writers, journalists, academics, and human rights activists. In            
considering convictions resulting from charges of “disseminating propaganda on behalf of a            
terrorist organization”, the ECtHR has held that such statements in writings, books, publications             
and so on do not justify interference in freedom of expression. Even when expressions are               294
deliberately provocative, the Court has determined that any interference with freedom of            
expression requires “very strong reasoning for justifying restrictions.” In Sorguç v. Turkey            295
(2009) and Sapan v. Turkey (2010), the ECtHR further developed the distinct importance of              
academic freedom in the context of freedom of expression, asserting that it “should be afforded               
special protection.” Moreover, in its judgment concerning ​Aksu v. Turkey​, the ECtHR            296
emphasized that expressions deemed offensive or criminal must be viewed in their proper             
context: “It is also in line with the Court’s approach to consider the impugned passages not in                 
isolation but in the context of the book as a whole.” This is critical in considering Turkey’s                 297
terror-related prosecutions of journalists and reporters, in which the government has failed to             
properly consider the context of the expressions being made.  
 
The trajectory of Turkey’s acquiescence to the authority of the ECtHR and its judgments appears               
largely dependent on its relationship with the EU, highlighting the interplay between            
international politics and human rights law. In the early 2000s, Turkey implemented a series of               
legislative reforms to its human rights and anti-terror laws as part of the EU accession process,                
and the first period of AKP rule saw a significant “toning down” of recourse to anti-terrorism                
legislation. More recently, Turkey amended its legislation on freedom of expression in            298
response to the judgments of the ECtHR, which successfully influenced the Law on             
292 Akdeniz and Altiparmak, “Turkey: Freedom of Expression,” 4.  
293 ​Ibid, ​4.  
294  ​Ibid​. 
295 ​See​ Sürek v. Turkey (1), no. 26682/95, para 61., Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, 13.10.2014, para. 77. 
296  ​See ​Sorguç v. Turkey, no.17089/03, 23.6.2009, para. 35; Sapan v. Turkey, no. 44102/04, 8.6.2010, para. 34. 
297 Aksu v. Turkey [BD], nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, para. 72. ​https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d4f13a/pdf/​.  
298 ​Akdeniz and Altiparmak, “Turkey: Freedom of Expression,” 5.  
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Amendments to Some Laws in Relation to Human Rights and Freedom of Expression (Law No.               
6459) in 2013. This law was welcomed as a clear indication that Turkey was taking serious steps                 
to bring its domestic legislation in line with Strasbourg jurisprudence.   299
 
As EU accession talks stalled, however, the increasingly frayed relationship between Turkey and             
the West has negatively impacted the ability of the ECtHR to restrain human rights violations.               
According to a 2017 Turkey country report prepared by the ECHR monitoring body within the               
Council of Europe, Turkey has only implemented 52% of ECtHR judgments; 1,384 judgments             
have yet to be executed. Turkey ranks third, behind Italy and Russia, in terms of member states                 300
failing to comply with ECtHR rulings. The expanding anti-terrorism powers and marked increase             
in human rights violations described above seem to be a clear indication that Turkey’s              
compliance with ECtHR judgments is worsening rather than improving.  
 
B. The Role of International Politics 
 
Turkey’s refusal to respect its obligations under international human rights law raises a less              
discussed but equally important question: why has there been relatively little legal and political              
response from the international community? Under the SoE, the Turkish government has shown             
a wanton disregard for human rights, broken several of its legal commitments as a states party to                 
international human rights treaties, and trampled over the fundamental principles of emergencies,            
including the violation of sacrosanct non-derogable rights. Yet Turkey has suffered few political             
repercussions and the international community has been reluctant to apply any significant            
pressure despite massive abuses of Turkish citizens during the SoE.  
 
The failure of the international community to more zealously enforce international human rights             
law can be attributed to current political dynamics, the result of Turkey’s successful efforts to               
make itself a key geopolitical player on the world stage. First, Turkey is a key strategic asset in                  
the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an American-led               
initiative consisting of 70 nations and four international organizations. Given the wave of             301
terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIS or its lone wolf followers in Western cities including Paris,               
Brussels, London, and Barcelona, the counterterrorism campaign has been a central political goal             
of many Western and European governments and a matter of much public interest. Turkey, who               
299 Onur Andreotti and Nils Muižnieks,​ Journalism at risk: Threats, challenges and perspectives​ (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2015), 146.  
300 Sedat Ergin, “Turkey fails to implement ECHR decisions,” ​Hurriyet Daily News, ​December 22, 2017, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-ergin/turkey-fails-to-implement-echr-decisions-124537​.  
301 The four organizations are the European Union, NATO, the Arab League, and Interpol. ​See​ “The Global 
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shares its southern border with both Iraq and Syria, has proven itself strategically and militarily               
essential by allowing the coalition to launch airstrikes against ISIS from its Incirlik Air Base.  
 
Beyond the coalition, Turkey has used the Syrian conflict to significantly increase its power in               
the international arena. As thousands fled Syria in 2015, travelling through Turkey to Europe in               
search of refuge, a wave of xenophobic backlash and populist fearmongering caused the EU to               
search for a way to stem the influx. On March 20, 2016, Brussels and Ankara struck a deal: in                   
effect, Turkey would stop the flow of asylum seekers and allow asylum seekers arriving on the                
Greek islands to be returned, in exchange for €6 billion from the EU, to be used to host the                   
Syrian refugee communities, in addition to receiving visa-free travel for its citizens and             
fast-tracked EU membership. Politically, the Syrian crisis deepened tensions between          302
Moscow, who backed President Bashar Assad, and Washington, who initially called for him to              
step down amidst the uprising in 2011 and subsequently armed and trained rebel groups during               
the ensuing civil war. Turkey has used this rift to assume the role of mediator between the US                  
and Russia, thereby further increasing its status as an important player on the world stage.               303
Ankara’s burgeoning relationship with Moscow has caused calls to cancel its NATO            
membership, but Turkey remains too important a regional ally to Western countries seeking to              
curb Iranian ambition and balance Russian and Chinese interests in the Middle East and Eurasia.  
 
The case of Turkey demonstrates that a country’s overall political power in the global arena               
impacts the extent to which other states police and enforce international human rights law. This               
is certainly not an issue unique to Turkey: countries often remain silent on human rights issues in                 
order to achieve foreign policy goals or maintain strong trade and economic relations. Canada              
and the UK, for example, have been criticized for silence on human rights issues in Saudi Arabia                 
in exchange for profitable arms deals and other trade. American silence on Israeli human rights               
abuses in Gaza and the West Bank have been attributed to Israel’s strategic value in the Middle                 
East, among other things, while silence on China is similarly tied to its status as the world’s                 
second-largest economy. As Fitzpatrick (2003) wrote: “Liberal democracies sacrifice their          
leverage over repressive governments… by crassly agreeing to tone down or silence criticism in              
exchange for cooperation in counter-terrorist strategies. Pai and Singh similarly noted in 2014             304
that Western powers calculate that “engaging Middle Eastern and East Asian countries in             
regional security and trade arrangements is more important than letting human rights issues             
derail them.”   305
302 Tuncay Şahin, “How does the EU-Turkey refugee deal work?” ​TRT World, ​October 24, 2017, 
https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/how-does-the-eu-turkey-refugee-deal-work--11588​.  
303 Dorian Jones, “Turkey to Mediate between US, Russia on Syria Tensions,” ​VOA, ​April 13, 2018, 
https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-mediate-ys-russia-syria-tensions/4347035.html​.  
304 ​Fitzpatrick, “Speaking Law to Power,” 262.  
305 Nitin Pai and Sushant Singh, “Promoting human rights in the Indo-Pacific: Prospects, drivers and constraints,” in 
“Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy,” eds. Doutje Lettinga and Lars van Troost, Amnesty International 
 
 




C. The Politics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
 
Turkey was already an anomaly with regard to terrorism prosecutions prior to the current SoE. In                
the decade following 9/11, Turkey accounted for a third of the total of 35,000 terrorism               
convictions worldwide. The astonishing quantitative difference in Turkey’s terrorism         306
prosecutions record is partially a result of its qualitative assessments of what constitutes             
terrorism. As then-Interior Minister Idris Naim Sahin stated in an infamous 2011 speech, Turkey              
is unique in its criminalization of several different categories of terrorism, including ‘artistic’,             
‘scientific’, ‘poetic’, and ‘journalistic’ terrorism. Erdogan publicly endorsed the further          307
broadening of Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws in March 2016: “It might be the terrorist who pulls               
the trigger and detonates the bomb, but it is these supporters and accomplices who allow that                
attack to achieve its goal. The fact their title is politician, academic, writer, journalist or head of a                  
civil society group does not change the fact that individual is a terrorist.”  308
 
The country’s hardcore views of terrorism have long been a stumbling block to Turkey’s bid for                
EU accession and visa liberalization. In May 2016, for example, negotiations for visa-free access              
to the EU collapsed over Turkey’s refusal to narrow its definition of “terror” and change its                
domestic anti-terrorism legislation to prevent the politicized prosecutions of journalists,          
academics, and government critics. Instead, Turkey has intensified its counterterrorism          309
campaign: in the two years following the failed 2016 coup, more than 64,000 Turkish nationals               
have been imprisoned on terrorism-related charges.   310
 
The broad interpretation of counterterrorism hinges on the equally elusive concept of ‘terrorism’.             
Terrorism has no universally accepted definition, as exemplified by a famous 1988 survey that              
found more than 100 definitions of terrorism had been used in the relevant literature. It should                311
Netherlands (March 2015): 38, 
https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2015/04/amn15_01_strategische_verkenningen_india_digitaal_def.pdf​. 
306 Martha Mendoza, “Rightly or wrongly, thousands convicted of terrorism post-9/11,” NBC News, Sept. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44389156/ns/us_news-9_11_ten_years_later/t/rightly-or-wrongly-thousands-convicted-
terrorism-post-/​.  
307 Ayça Çubukçu,“‘Operational Accidents’: On the Turkish State and Kurdish Deaths,” ​Jadaliyya, ​December 30, 
2011, ​http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/25023/Operational-Accidents-On-the-Turkish-State-and-Kurdish-Deaths​.  
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be emphasized that most definitions of ‘terrorism’ possess some form of violence. The grey area               
is in indirect, non-violent forms of terrorism, such as ‘providing material support for’ a terrorist               
group that consequently enables it to perpetrate acts of violence. It is this blurrier area of                
terrorism that allows for broad, vaguely defined counterterrorism policies, in turn ensnaring or             
deliberately targeting legitimate dissenters and penalizing supporters of dissenting ideas,          
opinions critical of the government, and opposition groups in politics, civil society, and             
elsewhere. With the rise of social media opening the door to dangerous new interpretations of               
‘spreading terrorist propaganda’ and other indirect terror-related offences, developing a more           
uniform conceptualization of the bounds of terrorism and counterterrorism is paramount. The            
lack of a uniform, internationally-agreed upon understanding of ‘terrorism’ allows countries a            
wide discretion to employ highly questionable counterterrorism policies, which is broadened           
further by states of emergency.  
 
D. Normalizing Exception: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Turkey is not alone: as previously pointed out by UN Rapporteur Leandro Despouy, “if the list                
of countries which have proclaimed, extended or terminated a state of emergency were to be               
projected onto a map of the world... the resulting area would cover nearly three-quarters of the                
Earth’s surface.” Recently, however, SoE regimes are growing in depth, breadth, and            312
frequency: in the last two years, France, Tunisia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Mali              
have all imposed and subsequently extended states of emergency. The spike in SoEs is an               313
alarming trend for two reasons: first, technological advancement allows for new and more             
sophisticated violations of human rights and civil liberties, and second, SoE regimes are             
increasingly incorporating exceptional measures into permanent law. 
 
The alarming growth of SoE regimes and the incorporation of extraordinary counterterrorism            
measures into permanent domestic legal frameworks begs one final question: are rights            
derogations really necessary? Emergency derogation provisions in the ECHR and the ICCPR are             
based on the premise that suspending rights is necessary to restoring public order and protecting               
national security, but the actual evidence affirming its effectiveness in doing so is scant. On the                
contrary, in fact, many terrorism scholars have identified human rights violations as a chief ​cause               
of radicalization and homegrown terrorism. Even if human rights derogations are effective in the              
short-term, it is worth considering whether the potential unrest sparked by expansive government             
crackdowns on human rights is in fact counterproductive. The necessity of derogation clauses is              
312 ​Report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Leandro Despouy, on the question of Human Rights and States of 
Emergency, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1997/19 (June 23, 1997). Available at: 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/demo/HumanRightsandStatesofEmergency_Despouy.pdf​ para. 181.  
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further undercut by the fact that only nine of 47 member states have ever invoked their right of                  
derogation. Moreover, the popular assertion that states would refuse to sign international            314
human rights treaties like the ECHR and the ICCPR without the derogation ‘escape clause’ is               
weakened by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which unequivocally rejected             
emergency derogations and yet has been ratified by 54 states. Rather than accepting the              315
premise on its face, exploring the very idea that suspending human rights is necessary to protect                
national security merits deeper scrutiny.  
 
Ultimately, this paper finds that states of emergency lead to serious human rights abuses on the                
pretext of countering terror, directly facilitated by the unique powers that states of emergency              
bestow on the executive at the expense of judicial and parliamentary levels of government. In               
analyzing Turkey as its chief case study, this paper finds that states of emergency produce two                
sets of human rights abuses. First, states of emergency allow for the rapid and unchecked               
passage of broad counterterrorism legislation and policies that criminalize nonviolent dissent and            
legitimate criticism of government policy, violating rights to privacy and endangering           
fundamental freedoms of speech, expression, and assembly. Second, the increased powers of the             
police and security services under states of emergency create serious abuses in relation to              
detentions, prosecutions and the rule of law, found to violate rights to a fair trial and due process                  
and the right to be free from torture and other cruel and degrading punishment. The effects of                 
unbridled counterterrorism campaigns are particularly felt by already marginalized and          
securitized ethnic minorities.  
 
The case of Turkey offers interesting insight into how the international human rights community              
can strengthen protections of individuals beyond their jurisdiction. The cross-border nature of            
Turkey’s human rights violations under the SoE highlights key weaknesses in the global             
protection of political dissidents. First, the international human rights community should lobby            
for an international extradition convention to replace the current patchwork of bilateral treaties.             
The current system leaves political dissidents vulnerable to forced returns from weaker states to              
those it fears or depends on, or at risk of being used by governments to negotiate separate                 
strategic goals. The current system should be replaced with a rights-based legal process overseen              
by an independent monitoring body, so as to ensure strong judicial oversight and full respect for                
the principle of ​non-refoulement​. Lessening the political influence on extradition processes           
would be a positive step in strengthening the global protection of dissidents. 
 
314 Member states that have invoked their right of derogation are Albania, Armenia, France, Georgia, Greece, 
Ireland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Ukraine. ​See​ “Derogation in time of emergency - factsheet.” European 
Court of Human Rights -Press Unit. August 2018. ​https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Derogation_ENG.pdf​, 2.  
315 Nugraha, “Human rights derogations,” 201.  
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Second, the international community should renew previous attempts to negotiate an           
international Terrorism Convention. Establishing a uniform understanding or agreement of what           
constitutes terrorism, and what differentiates acts of terror from political dissent and civil             
obedience, may help restrain ​counter​terrorism policies as a result. This would also serve to              
establish a common basis for extraditions even within the existing bilateral framework.            
Relatedly, Turkey’s misuse of the Interpol Red Notice system to have political dissidents             
arrested and returned suggests that this system is in urgent need of reform to prevent politicized                
and unlawful arrests. Finally, Turkey’s previous willingness to engage in substantial human            
rights and anti-terror reforms during the EU accession negotiations underscores how political and             
economic harmony in the bloc can be successfully leveraged against incentivized states to             
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